Preventive detention cannot be used to circumvent ordinary criminal law when bail is granted for property offences.

The petitioner’s wife challenged a detention order dated 24.01.2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City

The detaining authority classified the petitioner as a “dangerous person” under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act)

The detention was based on five criminal cases registered against the petitioner between October and November 2025 for offenses punishable under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

The petitioner had been granted bail in all five offenses by the concerned court prior to the execution of the detention order

1. Whether the detention order passed under the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law given the material available to the detaining authority

2. Whether the activities of the detenue, based on the registered FIRs, constituted a threat to "public order" as opposed to "law and order"

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts offenses under specific chapters of the IPC/BNS or Arms Act

It relied on the constitutional safeguards under Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b) regarding preventive detention.

Furthermore, the court applied the precedent from *Dhaya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which emphasizes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power to be used sparingly and should not be used to circumvent ordinary criminal law when bail is granted

The court found that the detaining authority failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s actions disturbed "public order" or "public tranquility" specifically

While the authority relied on five pending criminal cases, the court reasoned that these offenses did not have a sufficient nexus to the maintenance of public order and were instead matters of ordinary law and order

The court noted that because the petitioner had been granted bail by competent courts, the state should have moved for cancellation of bail if they feared further offenses, rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention

The court concluded that the subjective satisfaction of the authority was reached mechanically without adequate material to prove that the petitioner’s liberty was "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order"

The court held that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was not legal or valid as the alleged activities did not affect the maintenance of public order

The respondent authorities were directed to set the petitioner at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case