Preventive detention is unsustainable when criminal cases fail to demonstrate any prejudice to maintenance of public order.

The petitioner’s husband (the detenue) was preventively detained by an order dated 02.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City

The authority classified him as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA)

The grounds for detention were based on two criminal cases registered against the detenue under Sections 331(4), 305A, and 54 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) between January 2025 and January 2026

The petitioner challenged the detention, arguing it was passed mechanically without evidence that the detenue’s actions disturbed public order

1. Whether the detention order passed under the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law based on the material available to the Detaining Authority

2. Whether the criminal activities of the detenue, as cited in the grounds of detention, truly qualify as being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order"

The court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as a habitual offender committing specific IPC/BNS offences over three successive years

It further relied on the Supreme Court precedent in *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which emphasizes that preventive detention is an extraordinary power and an exception to Article 21 that must be used sparingly

The doctrine established in *SK. Nazneen* and *Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana* was also applied, holding that if an accused is granted bail, the State should move for cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to preventive detention unless public order is genuinely threatened

The Court examined the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and found it flawed.

It noted that while the detenue was involved in two criminal cases under the BNS, he had already been granted bail by the concerned court for those offences

The Bench reasoned that these individual criminal acts did not inherently disturb the "maintenance of public order" but were rather issues of "law and order"

Following the Supreme Court's mandate, the Court observed that the appropriate remedy for the State, if they feared further offences, was to seek cancellation of bail under ordinary law rather than "clipping the wings" of the accused through preventive detention

The Court concluded that there was no sufficient material to prove that the detenue's activities adversely affected the society at large to a degree necessitating extraordinary detention

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated 02.02.2026, and directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case

Rule was made absolute