Preventive detention is unsustainable when ordinary criminal law and bail cancellation provide sufficient remedies.

The petitioner, classified as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), was preventively detained by an order dated 29.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat.

The detention was based on two criminal cases registered against the petitioner on 14.01.2026 involving offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Gujarat Police Act.

The petitioner had already been granted bail in these offences by the concerned court before the detention order was executed.

The petitioner challenged the detention through his mother, alleging a lack of material to justify that his actions disturbed public order.

Whether the activities of the petitioner qualified as being "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" under the PASA Act to justify preventive detention.

Whether the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction was legally sustainable given that the petitioner had already been granted bail in the underlying criminal cases.

The court applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits specific IPC/BNS offences.

It relied on the constitutional safeguards under Article 21 and Article 22(3)(b), as interpreted in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, establishing that preventive detention is an exception to be used only in rare cases.

Furthermore, it applied the precedent from Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala (AIR 2025 SC 2868), SK. Nazneen, and Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana, which hold that if ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) provides sufficient remedy, the extraordinary power of preventive detention should not be invoked.

The Court reasoned that the mere registration of two criminal cases did not provide sufficient material to conclude that the petitioner’s activities disturbed "public order" as opposed to "law and order".

The bench observed that the detaining authority failed to demonstrate how the public tranquility was compromised.

Crucially, the Court noted that the petitioner had been granted bail by a competent court; following the Supreme Court’s mandate, the state should have sought the cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law if they feared further offences, rather than resorting to the "hard law" of preventive detention to "clip the wings" of an accused.

Consequently, the Court found the subjective satisfaction of the authority to be mechanical and without proper application of mind.

The Court allowed the petition and quashed the detention order dated 29.01.2026.

It directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other legal matter, and made the Rule absolute.