Preventive detention lacks legal validity when ordinary criminal law suffices and public order remains undisturbed.

The petitioner, Nuruddin @ Nuru Kamruddin Sheikh, challenged a detention order dated 19.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City

The order was issued under Section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), classifying the petitioner as a "bootlegger" based on a single criminal case registered on 02.10.2025 under Sections 65(A)(E), 98(2), 116(B), and 81 of the Prohibition Act

The petitioner had already been granted regular bail by a competent court for the underlying offence

At the time of the hearing, the petitioner was detained in Surat Jail

1. Whether the detention order passed by the Detaining Authority under the PASA Act, 1985, is sustainable in law based on the material available

2. Whether the activities of the petitioner as a "bootlegger" adversely affected or were likely to affect the maintenance of "public order" as defined under the Act

The court primarily applied Section 3 of the PASA Act, 1985, which empowers the state to detain persons to prevent activities prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order," and Section 2(b), which defines a "bootlegger"

It relied on the constitutional safeguards under Articles 226 and 227

The court further applied the precedent established in Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which holds that preventive detention is an extraordinary power and an exception to Article 21 that must be used sparingly and only when ordinary criminal law (such as cancellation of bail) is insufficient to address the threat

The court examined whether the Detaining Authority's subjective satisfaction was legally sound.

It noted that the detention was based on a single FIR in which the petitioner had already secured bail

The court reasoned that a single case under the Prohibition Act does not automatically equate to a disturbance of "public order" or "public tranquility"

Following the Supreme Court’s rationale in Dhanya M., the bench observed that the law of preventive detention should not be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal procedure or merely to "clip the wings" of an accused where the state failed to move for cancellation of bail

The court found that the authority failed to demonstrate how the petitioner’s specific actions posed a threat to the community at large rather than being a simple "law and order" issue

The court held that the material was insufficient to conclude that the petitioner's activities were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, rendering the subjective satisfaction of the authority invalid

The court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case