Prior consent for IVF treatment fulfills statutory requirements notwithstanding subsequent medical incapacity of the spouse.

The Petitioner, the wife of a Lance Naik in the Indian Army, sought a writ of mandamus for the retrieval and cryopreservation of her husband’s genetic material (sperm)

The couple, married in 2017, had jointly decided to conceive via In-Vitro Fertilization (IVF) in June 2023

In July 2025, the husband suffered a severe traumatic brain injury during an operational patrol in Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in a persistent vegetative state with no foreseeable neurological recovery

A court-ordered medical board reported that while surgical retrieval of sperm was technically feasible, the husband lacked the decision-making capacity to provide the informed consent required by the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021 (“ART Act”)

The Respondents argued that under Section 22(1)(a) of the ART Act, explicit written consent is a mandatory prerequisite

Section 22 of the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021, which mandates written informed consent from all parties seeking ART services and cryopreservation

Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which encompasses the fundamental right to reproductive autonomy and motherhood, as interpreted in X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi

The principle that procedure is the "handmaiden of justice"

Precedents from the Kerala High Court (Simi Rajan v. Union of India) and Delhi High Court (Gurvinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)) allowing sperm retrieval and posthumous reproduction based on demonstrated prior intent

The court held that because the couple had already volunteered for and commenced IVF procedures before the accident, a valid "mutual marital decision" to conceive was established

The court reasoned that insisting on fresh written consent from a person in a vegetative state is "physically impossible and impracticable"

The court observed that the ART Act’s purpose is to address reproductive health and medical concerns, and thus Section 22 must be interpreted to facilitate rather than obstruct fundamental rights

The court determined that a strict, literal interpretation of the procedural text would destroy the substantive intent of the legislation and the petitioner’s reproductive autonomy

By linking the husband's prior active participation in IVF to the present necessity, the court concluded that the original consent should not be deemed vitiated by the intervening incapacity

The court further declared that the wife's consent would serve as valid consent for her incapacitated husband for any further IVF steps

The respondents were directed to permit the retrieval and preservation of the genetic material, subject to other statutory compliances and the medical condition of the husband

The petition was disposed of with these directions