Prior delivery of the official benefit does not negate a subsequent demand for illegal gratification.

The appellant, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (Ministerial) posted in the Sports Cell of CISF Headquarters, handled matters concerning the complainant Inspector Ajay Kumar Vats’s kit allowance of ₹10,000 for participation as Coach of the Indian Junior Judo Team at the 5th Asian Junior Judo Championship.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant demanded ₹5,000 from the complainant for release of the allowance and reiterated the demand after handing over the cheque. The complainant lodged a complaint with the CBI, following which a trap was conducted on 28 October 2004. The appellant was allegedly apprehended after accepting ₹3,000 in tainted currency; the notes were recovered from him and the hand-wash and pocket-wash tests were positive for phenolphthalein.

The appellant denied the allegations and claimed that the money represented repayment of a friendly loan. The Trial Court convicted him under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and sentenced him to concurrent rigorous imprisonment of two years with fines.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded and accepted ₹3,000 as illegal gratification in connection with the complainant’s official kit allowance, notwithstanding that the cheque had already been delivered.

Whether the recovery of tainted currency, positive chemical tests, recorded conversation, and trap evidence established the foundational facts necessary to invoke the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Whether the appellant’s defence that the money was repayment of a friendly loan, together with alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence and the appellant’s limited official authority, created a reasonable doubt.

The Court applied Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), punishable under Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

It held, following the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, that proof of demand and acceptance or obtainment of illegal gratification is indispensable; mere recovery of money is insufficient.

Demand and acceptance may be proved through direct or circumstantial evidence, and the presumption of fact may arise only after the foundational facts are established.

Once acceptance of gratification is proved for Section 7, Section 20 mandates a rebuttable presumption that the money was accepted as a motive or reward.

Section 20 does not apply independently of proof of the foundational facts and does not govern Section 13(1)(d).

The Court also relied on Sita Soren v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 629, for the principle that the offence of bribery is complete upon acceptance of, or agreement to accept, the bribe and does not depend upon the subsequent performance or non-performance of the promised official act.

The Court held that the appellant’s lack of final sanctioning authority did not preclude a demand for gratification because he was the dealing hand associated with processing the allowance and had access to and delivered the cheque.

Although the cheque had been handed over before the trap, the complainant’s testimony established that the appellant continued to demand ₹5,000 as a reward, and this account was corroborated by the recorded pre-trap conversation, the testimony of the trap witnesses, recovery of the tainted notes, and positive hand- and pocket-wash results.

The discrepancy between the demanded ₹5,000 and the recovered ₹3,000 was explained by the complainant’s inability to arrange the full amount.

Variations concerning the motorcycle, clothing, pocket of recovery, and peripheral details were treated as immaterial because they did not undermine the core evidence of demand, acceptance, and recovery.

The appellant’s statement that he was “taking a loan,” his prior acquaintance with the complainant, and the alleged friendly-loan explanation were found unsupported by particulars or independent evidence and insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.

The presumption under Section 20 was therefore validly attracted, and the appellant failed to rebut it.

His conviction under Section 7 and under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to surrender forthwith to undergo the sentence, with the benefit of set-off under Section 428 Cr.P.C.