Procedural safeguards under second proviso to Section 5(1) PMLA are jurisdictional; non-recording of specific urgency vitiates attachment.

The Petitioner, widow of late Sri Kalegowda, claimed rights by inheritance to land in Sy.No. 13 of Malalavadi Village.

She alleged that Mysore Urban Development Authority (MUDA) utilized her land for Jayanagar Layout without formal acquisition and subsequently executed Sale Deeds for 14 alternative sites in her favor as compensation.

Following a private complaint by one Snehamayi Krishna, the Karnataka Lokayukta Police registered FIR Crime No. 11/2024 for various offenses including the PC Act and IPC.

Based on this, the Respondent (ED) registered ECIR/BGZO/25/2024 and issued a provisional attachment order (PAO) No. 14/2025 on 09.06.2025.

Although the Lokayukta filed a 'B' Report (final report exonerating accused) for Accused 1-4, which was accepted on 28.01.2026, the investigation against others remained pending.

The ED proceeded to attach the Petitioner's sites. The Petitioner challenged the PAO on the grounds of procedural non-compliance with Section 5 of the PMLA.

1. Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable/entertainable despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy under the PMLA?

2. Whether the Director/Deputy Director satisfied the mandatory procedural requirements under the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) of the PMLA before passing the provisional attachment order?

Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002, specifically the Second Proviso, which allows for emergency attachment "notwithstanding" the filing of a charge sheet (First Proviso) if the officer has "reason to believe" that non-attachment would frustrate proceedings.

The "Whirlpool Doctrine" from Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, which permits writ jurisdiction despite alternative remedies if the order is without jurisdiction or violates fundamental rights.

The "Taylor v. Taylor" principle: when a statute prescribes a specific manner for an act, it must be done in that manner alone.

The court first resolved the maintainability issue, holding that since the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA lacks the jurisdiction to test the procedural validity of the formation of belief under the Second Proviso to Section 5, a writ petition is the appropriate remedy.

On the merits, the court observed that the Second Proviso is an emergency power requiring "reasons to believe" recorded in writing, based on material, that immediate attachment is necessary to prevent frustration of the Act.

Upon reviewing the PAO, the court found that Paragraph 9 was merely a "copy-paste" of statutory language without objective material linking the Petitioner's specific properties to an imminent risk of dissipation.

Crucially, the court noted that the Petitioner had not even obtained 'Katha' (mutation entries) for the sites, making it legally impossible for her to transfer the properties or create third-party rights; thus, there was no factual basis to believe the proceedings would be frustrated if attachment were not immediate.

On the second issue, it held that the ED failed to adhere to the mandate of the Second Proviso to Section 5(1) by failing to record specific reasons based on material for the necessity of immediate attachment.

Consequently, the High Court set aside the Provisional Attachment Order dated 09.06.2025 and all subsequent confirmation proceedings by the Adjudicating Authority, while reserving liberty to the ED to initiate fresh proceedings if lawful grounds are established.