Proceeding ex parte does not, by itself, establish knowledge of the eventual decree for limitation.

The plaintiff brought a suit seeking declaration of title, partition, and separate possession. Defendants No. 1 to 3 participated in the suit but were later proceeded against ex parte; their application under Order IX Rule 7 CPC was rejected, and the suit was decreed on 5 February 2022.

Defendants No. 1 and 3 appealed under Section 96 CPC approximately 24 months out of time and sought condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. They asserted that they first learned of the decree on 2 May 2024 and promptly sought copies and filed the appeal. The first appellate court rejected the condonation application and dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

The High Court admitted their second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the first appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal as time-barred despite the appellants’ stated grounds for condonation of delay?

2. Whether the appellants’ earlier participation in the suit and application under Order IX Rule 7 CPC established that they knew of the eventual judgment and decree?

The appeal was considered under Section 100 CPC, which permits second-appeal review on a substantial question of law.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits an appeal filed out of time to be admitted where sufficient cause for the delay is shown.

The court applied the principle that delay-condonation matters should be approached liberally to advance substantial justice, rather than by searching for fault in the applicant’s case.

It also treated being proceeded against ex parte and having knowledge of the eventual judgment and decree as distinct matters; the former alone does not establish the latter.

The appellants stated that their counsel had assured them he would keep them informed, but did not notify them of the decree; they claimed they learned of it only on 2 May 2024 and then acted promptly.

The respondent alleged prior knowledge but did not identify when, how, or through whom that knowledge was conveyed, and produced no evidence supporting the allegation.

Nor did the appellants’ earlier application under Order IX Rule 7 CPC establish that they knew the suit had ultimately been decreed: the court distinguished knowledge of ex-parte proceedings from knowledge of the later judgment and decree.

In the circumstances, the High Court found sufficient cause for the delay and held that the first appellate court had taken an unduly fault-finding approach instead of advancing substantial justice.

It directed the first appellate court to decide that appeal on its merits; the second appeal was allowed and disposed of, with the lower appellate court’s record directed to be returned immediately.