Procreation via fertility treatment is not a ground for ordinary leave under the Sentence Rules.

The petitioner, wife of convict Muthumani (serving life imprisonment for a triple murder conviction affirmed on 26.02.2026), sought 21 days of ordinary leave for her husband to undergo fertility treatment

The second respondent rejected the representation via order dated 11.09.2025, citing reports from the Probation Officer and Police regarding potential life threats to the prisoner and potential law and order issues

The petitioner challenged this rejection via a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

1. Whether the ground of undergoing fertility treatment for the purpose of procreation is a valid basis for granting ordinary leave under the relevant prison rules

2. Whether the court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to grant leave based on the right to procreate, balancing it against the welfare of the unborn child

The court primarily applied Rule 20 of the Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules, 1982, which enumerates the specific grounds under which ordinary leave may be granted

It established that leave is a privilege regulated by statute, not an absolute right

While acknowledging the petitioner’s reliance on Abhaya V Venu v. State of Kerala (W.P.Crl.No.723 of 2023) regarding the right to procreate, the court clarified that such judicial interventions are case-specific and do not constitute a binding precedent for all ordinary leave petitions

The court reasoned that since Rule 20 of the Tamil Nadu Suspension of Sentence Rules, 1982, does not explicitly include "fertility treatment" as a ground for ordinary leave, the request cannot be claimed as a matter of right

Addressing the petitioner’s argument for extraordinary relief under Article 226, the court pivoted to a "welfare of the child" analysis. It held that the right of the convict and spouse to procreate must be balanced against the potential interests of the child.

The court observed that a child born under these circumstances would face a lifelong social stigma and psychological burden due to the father's conviction for a heinous triple murder

It concluded that the state’s interest in reformation and the child's future well-being outweighed the convict's desire to procreate while serving a life sentence

The court answered that seeking leave for fertility treatment is not a statutory right under the 1982 Rules and refused to exercise discretionary powers, emphasizing that neither the petitioner nor the convict has the right to place a child in a position of inevitable social stigma

All connected miscellaneous petitions were closed with no costs awarded