Professional pursuits and autonomy of a wife cannot be treated as matrimonial cruelty or desertion.

The parties married in 2009. The appellant (a qualified dentist) initially moved with the respondent (an Army officer) to various postings

Due to a high-risk pregnancy and subsequent medical complications of their minor daughter (seizures), the appellant returned to Ahmedabad to secure medical facilities and established her own dental clinic

The Family Court granted the husband a divorce, concluding that the appellant’s refusal to sacrifice her career to follow her husband’s remote postings and her decision to open a clinic without consent amounted to "cruelty" and "desertion"

The High Court of Gujarat affirmed this decree

The appellant approached the Supreme Court seeking to expunge the findings of cruelty and desertion while not contesting the divorce itself

1. Whether a professionally qualified woman’s decision to pursue her career and ensure a safe medical environment for her child, independent of her husband’s place of posting, constitutes matrimonial cruelty or desertion

2. Whether the findings of "cruelty" and "desertion" recorded by the lower courts were based on archaic societal assumptions unsustainable under modern jurisprudence

3. Whether the husband's application for perjury under Section 340 CrPC against the wife was maintainable

The Court applied the principles of matrimonial jurisprudence under the Hindu Marriage Act and Special Marriage Act, emphasizing that marriage does not eclipse a woman's individual identity or autonomy

It relied on the constitutional guarantees of dignity and equal participation of women in the workforce

Regarding the procedural law, the Court applied Section 195 read with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which requires a "prima facie" case of deliberate falsehood in the interest of justice to initiate a prosecution for perjury

The Court critiqued the lower courts' "pedantic and regressive" approach, noting that characterizing a wife’s professional aspirations as "defiance" or "cruelty" is legally unsustainable in the 21st century

It reasoned that a wife is not a "mere appendage" to the husband’s household and her refusal to allow her qualifications to lie "dormant" cannot be viewed as a matrimonial default

The Court observed that the appellant’s choices were necessitated by "responsible parenthood" due to the child's medical condition at remote postings like Kargil

It further noted that the husband’s attitude reflected "male chauvinism" and an "exalted status" that sought to veto the wife's professional identity

On the issue of perjury, the Court found the husband’s claims to be "hyper-technical" and motivated by "personal vendetta" rather than a genuine pursuit of justice

It upheld the decree of divorce solely on the ground of the "irretrievable breakdown of marriage," as both parties had moved on and the husband had remarried

Crucially, the Court expunged all findings and observations regarding "cruelty" and "desertion" against the appellant, declaring them "atrocious," "archaic," and "baseless"

The special leave petition filed by the husband seeking prosecution of the wife for perjury was dismissed for lack of merit