Prolonged incarceration and an unlikely prompt trial may warrant bail even in serious POCSO cases.

The applicant sought bail under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in FIR No. 54/2022, registered for offences under Sections 363, 376 and 109 IPC read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

His application had been rejected by the trial court on 23 December 2025.

He had remained in custody for more than four years while the trial was pending.

He relied on the delay, alleged deficiencies and variations in the statements, the parties’ alleged relationship, and the absence of forensic evidence.

The respondents opposed bail, emphasizing the seriousness of the allegations, the victim’s age and the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act.

Whether the applicant’s prolonged pre-trial detention and the absence of a reasonably proximate conclusion to the trial justified release on bail, notwithstanding the gravity of the POCSO allegations.

Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act precluded bail, and whether the alleged relationship between the parties could be considered for the limited purpose of assessing custody.

Section 483 BNSS empowers the High Court to grant bail. Article 21 protects the right to a speedy trial, and pre-trial detention is not to operate as punishment; bail assessment may consider the risk of absconding, interference with justice, witness intimidation and repetition of the offence (State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308).

Prolonged incarceration and the lack of a reasonable prospect of trial conclusion may justify bail notwithstanding the gravity of the offence (Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713).

Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act create statutory presumptions but do not impose an absolute bar to bail; the application remains fact-specific.

A bail court must make only a prima facie assessment, not conduct a mini-trial.

A minor’s consent has no legal validity under the POCSO Act, although surrounding circumstances may be considered for the limited purpose of bail without treating the relationship as a defence.

The Court treated the allegations as serious and accepted that a child’s alleged consent could not provide a defence under the POCSO Act.

It nevertheless found that the applicant had been in custody for more than four years and that the prosecution had not shown the trial was likely to conclude soon.

The respondents identified no specific material indicating that release on strict conditions would lead to absconding, witness influence, evidence tampering or repetition of the offence.

The Court declined to resolve disputed questions about the statements, medical evidence, alleged relationship or absence of forensic material, leaving their evidentiary effect to the trial court.

It concluded that the statutory presumptions did not displace the need to assess continued detention under the ordinary bail principles.

The Court clarified that its observations were prima facie and would not affect the trial court’s independent assessment of the evidence.