Prolonged Incarceration Does Not Warrant Bail Where Delay in Trial Is Attributable to the Accused

The appellant, a contractor, was arrested on 15.10.2024 for the alleged abduction and murder of his employee, Sandeep Lakda, who was suspected of stealing construction materials.

The prosecution alleges the deceased was physically assaulted to death and buried under concrete to conceal evidence.

Following the dismissal of a previous appeal on merits and the withdrawal of an SLP before the Supreme Court with liberty to refile if the trial stalled, the appellant filed a second bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The Special Judge (Atrocities Act), Ambikapur, rejected the application on 03.11.2025, leading to this appeal.

1. Whether the appellant is entitled to bail on the grounds of prolonged incarceration (15 months) and lack of progress in the trial.

2. Whether there exists a substantial change in circumstances since the dismissal of the previous bail application on merits to warrant the grant of bail.

The Court considered Section 14-A(2) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, regarding appeals against bail orders.

It assessed the application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (analogous to Section 439 CrPC).

The Court also referenced the principle of "change in circumstances" necessary for a successive bail application after a prior rejection on merits.

Penal provisions involved included Sections 302, 365, 201, 120(B), and 147 of the IPC, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.

The Court noted that the appellant’s previous bail plea was dismissed on merits in May 2025.

While the appellant argued that only one out of 72 witnesses had been examined in 15 months, the Court observed from the record that delays were partially attributable to the defense seeking adjournments for cross-examination, as well as the non-appearance of witnesses.

The Court determined that the gravity of the offense—involving abduction, murder, and destruction of evidence—coupled with the lack of any significant "change in circumstances" since the last merit-based rejection, outweighed the plea for bail based on trial delay.

It found that the liberty granted by the Supreme Court did not automatically entitle the appellant to bail if the trial’s slow progress was not solely the fault of the prosecution.

The Court held that no substance or change in circumstances existed to extend the privilege of bail after the previous dismissal on merits.

However, to protect the appellant's right to a speedy trial, the Court directed the Trial Court to expedite and conclude the proceedings within one year.

It further ordered the Superintendent of Police to ensure timely service of summons and directed all accused persons to cooperate with the trial schedule.