Prolonged separation and conduct causing irretrievable marital breakdown constitute cruelty warranting divorce.

The appellant-wife and respondent-husband were married on 7 May 2007 and had a male child born on 3 January 2009.

The wife alleged that the husband failed to take her to his place of residence, subjected her to verbal and mental cruelty, accused her of mental illness and immoral character, and ultimately left her at her parental home.

She further alleged that the parties had lived separately since February 2013 and that the husband had failed to maintain her and their minor son.

The wife instituted Matrimonial (Divorce) Case No. 20 of 2022 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Lakhisarai.

Despite service, the husband did not appear, and the suit was dismissed ex parte on 15 June 2024 on the ground that the wife had not produced specific evidence of cruelty.

The wife preferred the present appeal.

The High Court first condoned the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and thereafter heard the appeal.

Whether the delay in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Whether the husband’s prolonged separation, failure to resume matrimonial cohabitation, and unchallenged allegations of cruelty constituted matrimonial cruelty warranting dissolution of marriage.

Whether a decree of divorce could be granted solely on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, under which delay may be condoned where the appellant establishes “sufficient cause” for not preferring the proceeding within the prescribed limitation period.

In matrimonial proceedings, the Court treated conduct resulting in the permanent and prolonged denial of matrimonial companionship, coupled with unchallenged allegations of abusive and humiliating treatment, as constituting mental cruelty.

The Court also recognised that irretrievable breakdown of marriage, by itself, was not a ground on which it could directly grant divorce, but held that conduct causing such breakdown may constitute cruelty warranting dissolution of marriage.

No specific statutory provision or precedent was expressly identified in the judgment.

The Court was satisfied that the wife had shown sufficient cause for the delay and therefore allowed the limitation application.

On the merits, the husband had neither contested the divorce proceedings before the Family Court nor appeared before the High Court despite substituted service.

His prolonged refusal to resume cohabitation, the parties’ separation for more than thirteen years, and his failure to challenge the wife’s allegations of abuse, humiliation, and abandonment demonstrated that the matrimonial relationship had effectively ceased.

Although the Court held that it could not grant divorce solely on the basis of irretrievable breakdown, it regarded the husband’s conduct producing that breakdown and depriving the wife of a continuing matrimonial relationship as mental cruelty.

The Family Court’s insistence on specific proof of cruelty, despite the uncontroverted pleadings and surrounding circumstances, was therefore held unsustainable.

The High Court held that the husband’s prolonged separation and unchallenged conduct amounted to cruelty and justified dissolution of the marriage, while clarifying that irretrievable breakdown alone could not independently support the decree.

The Family Court’s judgment dated 15 June 2024 was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the wife was granted a decree dissolving the marriage by divorce.

The Registry was directed to draw up the decree accordingly.