Propounders must prove conscious execution and independent advice for instruments executed by illiterate or pardanashin women.

The dispute involves a claim over properties originally belonging to Bhika Gouda, who died in 1951

The Plaintiff (Golapi) claimed title over 'A' and 'B' schedule properties through two gift deeds executed in 1980 by Bhika’s widow, Jasoda, and a subsequent sale deed from Sakuntala (Bhika’s daughter)

Defendant No. 1 (Bhagirathi), the husband of Bhika’s deceased daughter Radhika, contested the suit, claiming he was an illatom son-in-law and that Jasoda, being old, illiterate, and of unsound mind, was incompetent to execute the gift deeds

The Trial Court held the gift deeds were not proved to be validly executed as Jasoda was a pardanashin and illiterate lady who lacked independent legal advice

However, the Trial Court decreed the suit in part based on the Hindu Succession Act

The First Appellate Court, despite the Plaintiff not filing a cross-appeal, invoked Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC to reverse the finding on the gift deeds, validating them and declaring the Plaintiff's title over the entire property

1. Whether, in the absence of an appeal or cross-objection by the Plaintiff, the First Appellate Court could legally reopen and reverse the Trial Court's finding that the gift deeds (Ext. 1) were invalid

2. Whether the First Appellate Court erred in validating the gift deeds of an illiterate/pardanashin lady without disturbing the Trial Court's finding regarding the lack of conscious execution

The Court applied Order XLI Rule 33 of the CPC, which empowers an appellate court to pass any decree or order to do complete justice, even in favor of a party who has not filed an appeal or cross-objection

It relied on Bihar Supply Syndicate v. Asiatic Navigation [(1993) 2 SCC 639] and Koksingh v. Deokabai [(1976) 1 SCC 383] to confirm this wide discretionary power

Regarding the execution of documents by vulnerable persons, the Court applied the principles from Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan [(2023) 9 SCC 734], which places the burden on the propounder to remove all suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of a document

Furthermore, it applied the doctrine from Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai [AIR 1963 SC 1203] and Narayan Mishra v. Champa Dibya [AIR 1968 Ori 53], establishing that for documents executed by pardanashin or illiterate ladies, the propounder must affirmatively prove that the executant had independent legal advice and fully understood the nature and effect of the transaction

The Court first addressed the procedural issue, holding that the First Appellate Court was legally permitted under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC to re-examine the validity of the gift deeds despite the lack of a cross-appeal, as the issue was central to the dispute

However, on the merits of the execution, the Court found the First Appellate Court's reasoning flawed. The High Court emphasized that because Jasoda was an old, illiterate, pardanashin lady, the burden rested heavily on the Plaintiff to prove "conscious execution" and "intelligent understanding"

The Trial Court had correctly noted the absence of evidence showing Jasoda had independent legal advice or business capacity

The High Court rejected the First Appellate Court's view that a specific plea of "fraud" was necessary in the written statement to challenge the deeds; suspicious circumstances (age, illiteracy, ill health) alone were sufficient to shift the burden back to the propounder to dispel doubts

Since the Plaintiff failed to provide a cogent explanation to dispel these suspicions, the Trial Court’s finding of invalidity was legally sound

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court, thereby restoring the Trial Court's decision which had invalidated the gift deeds