### Proprietorship name is not a juristic person; claiming tenancy through it does not constitute forfeiture.

The respondent (Plaintiff) filed a suit for possession and arrears of rent against the appellants (Defendants), who are the legal heirs of the original tenant, Mohammad Siddique.

The Plaintiff alleged that the tenant had forfeited his lease under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act or impliedly surrendered it under Section 111(f) because the tenant and his heirs claimed that "M/s. Rafique Kirana Stores" (a partnership firm) was the tenant rather than Mohammad Siddique in his individual capacity.

The Trial Court dismissed the prayer for possession, granting only arrears of rent.

The First Appellate Court reversed this, granting possession and mesne profits, holding that the tenant's denial of his individual status constituted a ground for eviction.

1. Whether the first appellate Court recorded findings that were perverse or unsustainable in law while reversing the trial court decree?

2. Whether relief under Section 111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act for forfeiting tenancy was available to the landlord against the appellants?

3. Whether any of the appellants claimed tenancy in the capacity of legal heirs of the original tenant?

4. Whether the grant of damages and mesne profits by the first appellate Court was legally valid?

The Court applied Section 111(g)(2) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which provides for forfeiture of lease only if the lessee renounces his character by setting up a title in a third person or claiming title in himself.

It further relied on the legal principle that a sole proprietorship is not a juristic person but merely a name under which a person conducts business.

A partnership firm is a compendious name for its partners under Section 4 of the Partnership Act, 1932.

The court distinguished *Ratanlal Manikchand Shah v. Chanbasappa Sanganbasappa Chincholi*, noting that a disclaimer of a landlord’s title (denying the landlord is the owner) is distinct from a dispute over the specific identity or capacity of the recognized tenant.

The Court reasoned that Section 111(g)(2) requires the tenant to challenge the landlord's ownership or assert their own ownership to trigger forfeiture.

In this case, the Defendants expressly admitted the Plaintiff’s ownership and status as landlord in their pleadings.

The dispute was merely whether the tenancy was held by Mohammad Siddique personally or through his firm, "M/s. Rafique Kirana Stores".

Since a proprietorship or partnership is not a separate legal entity from the individuals involved, the claim that the "firm" was the tenant did not constitute a renunciation of the tenancy character or a "denial of title".

The Court viewed the Defendants' stance as a defensive measure to avoid allegations of subletting rather than an attempt to surrender the lease.

Consequently, the ingredients for implied surrender or forfeiture were not met.

It set aside the judgment of the First Appellate Court and restored the Trial Court’s decree, which had dismissed the suit for possession.

The Court held that since the decree for possession was unsustainable, the orders for damages and mesne profits were also quashed.

Any prayer for amendment of the plaint to include further allegations of "disclaimer of title" was rejected as the underlying facts regarding the firm's status remained the same.