Proved demand and acceptance of bribe sustain conviction despite an unsubstantiated display-charge defence.

The respondent, Junaid, was the Assistant Manager of the Kerala Civil Supplies Corporation, Chalakudy Depot.

The prosecution alleged that he demanded ₹2,000 from PW1 on 15 December 2008 and thereafter demanded and accepted ₹4,000 on 18 December 2008 for issuing cheques relating to vegetables supplied by PW1 to Civil Supplies Corporation outlets.

A vigilance trap was arranged. The tainted currency was recovered from the respondent’s shirt pocket, and phenolphthalein tests allegedly produced positive results on his hand, the currency notes, and the shirt pocket.

The Special Judge, Thrissur, acquitted the respondent in C.C. No. 13 of 2009, holding that the ₹4,000 had probably been received as permissible display charges rather than as illegal gratification.

The State appealed against the acquittal.

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent demanded and accepted ₹4,000 as illegal gratification for issuing the cheque due to PW1, thereby committing an offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Whether the respondent’s acceptance of the amount constituted criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

3. Whether the Special Judge’s acquittal required interference in an appeal against acquittal.

The Court applied Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, holding that proof of demand and acceptance or obtainment of illegal gratification is essential to establish the offences.

Under Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), demand and acceptance may be proved by direct, documentary, or circumstantial evidence; mere recovery or acceptance of money, without proof of the relevant demand or offer, is insufficient.

Once the foundational facts are proved, the statutory presumption under Section 20, in a prosecution under Section 7, must be raised that the gratification was received as a motive or reward, subject to rebuttal by the accused.

The Court also relied on State of Karnataka v. Chandrasha regarding the rebuttable presumption under Section 20 and the standard of preponderance of probabilities for rebuttal.

In an appeal against acquittal, interference is permissible where the trial court’s appreciation of evidence is erroneous or perverse, though the appellate court must properly re-appreciate the entire evidence.

The Court found the testimony of PW1 regarding the earlier demand of ₹2,000 and the subsequent demand of ₹4,000 to be supported by the complaint, pre-trap mahazar, trap evidence, recovery of the specifically marked currency notes, and the positive phenolphthalein tests.

The respondent did not dispute receipt of ₹4,000 but claimed that it represented display charges.

The Court rejected this explanation because the evidence of DW1 established that vegetables were not items for which display charges were ordinarily collected, the documents did not establish any lawful assessment or demand of ₹4,000, and retaining the money in the respondent’s pocket was inconsistent with the Corporation’s procedure for collecting such charges.

Ext. D5, showing payment of ₹1,000 towards display charges by PW1’s concern, did not prove that the ₹4,000 recovered during the trap was also a lawful display charge, particularly since the document did not specify the goods concerned.

Accordingly, the prosecution proved demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, while the respondent failed to rebut the statutory presumption even on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.

The Special Judge’s contrary conclusion was therefore held to be an improper evaluation of the evidence.

The respondent was sentenced to one year’s simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹20,000, with two months’ default simple imprisonment, for the Section 7 offence; and two years’ simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹40,000, with four months’ default simple imprisonment, for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2).

Execution of the sentence was directed to commence after one month, as the respondent’s sentence had been suspended and he had been released on bail for that period.