Proximate threats may constitute abetment of suicide when corroborated by call records and surrounding harassment.

The applicant sought quashing of FIR being C.R. No. I-11210067250295 of 2025 registered at Saroli Police Station, Surat, concerning the suicide of Sukhpreet Kaur.

The prosecution alleged that accused Mahendra Rajput had harassed, assaulted and blackmailed the deceased by threatening to circulate her private videos.

Shortly before the incident, the deceased allegedly contacted the applicant for financial assistance to meet Mahendra’s demand.

During a conference call arranged through witness Babli on the night of 01 May 2025, the applicant allegedly used abusive language, threatened the deceased, and stated that he would come to her house with Mahendra and demonstrate his power.

The deceased was found hanging in a room at her residence on 02 May 2025.

Her earlier written complaint dated 03 April 2025 named Mahendra and referred to blackmail, confinement, assault and threats, but did not mention the applicant; the post-mortem report corroborated injuries allegedly caused by Mahendra.

The applicant contended that he was not named in the FIR or the written complaint and that abusive language, without more, did not constitute instigation to suicide.

The State opposed quashing on the basis of the call-detail records, the witness statement and the recorded conversation.

1. Whether the allegations and material collected during investigation prima facie disclosed abetment of suicide by the applicant under Sections 306 and 107 of the IPC.

2. Whether the applicant’s non-mention in the FIR and the deceased’s earlier written complaint justified quashing of the criminal proceedings in the exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

3. Whether the alleged abusive and threatening conference call constituted instigation having a proximate nexus with the deceased’s suicide.

The Court applied Sections 306 and 107 IPC, under which abetment of suicide requires proof of instigation, intentional aid or conspiracy, and relied on the principle that instigation may be inferred from the accused’s acts, omissions or continued conduct creating circumstances in which the deceased feels compelled to commit suicide.

Relying on Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 9 SCC 734, the Court held that no straitjacket formula determines instigation and that the circumstances and their effect on the deceased must be assessed.

Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, and Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129, were applied for the rule that, at the quashing stage, the Court must determine only whether the allegations, taken at face value, prima facie constitute an offence and must not conduct a mini-trial or assess evidentiary sufficiency.

The Court also relied on Chitresh Kumar Chopra, Ramesh Kumar and Amalendu Pal for the requirement of intentional and proximate conduct capable of provoking or compelling suicide.

The applicant’s reliance on Sanju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2002 LawSuit (SC) 559, was distinguished on facts.

The Court found that the applicant’s role was not based merely on a solitary allegation of abusive language.

The call-detail records corroborated the conference call, while witness Babli’s statement and the recorded conversation indicated that the applicant threatened to visit the deceased with Mahendra, who had previously assaulted and injured her.

Considering the pre-existing fear created by Mahendra’s blackmail and physical assault, the Court held that the applicant’s immediate threats could prima facie have caused the deceased to feel frustrated and unable to continue living.

The proximity between the threatening call on the night of 01 May 2025 and the suicide on 02 May 2025 supplied the requisite nexus at the preliminary stage.

The earlier complaint’s failure to name the applicant did not exonerate him because it preceded the alleged conference call by approximately one month and did not negate the later material collected during investigation.

Applying the limited scope of quashing jurisdiction, the Court declined to evaluate the credibility or sufficiency of the evidence.

The applicant’s failure to be named in the earlier written complaint or FIR was not sufficient to warrant quashing.

The application for quashing the FIR was therefore rejected; the Rule was discharged.