Public authorities qualify as "persons" under Section 19 RTI Act entitled to maintain statutory appeals.

The Petitioner, the Supreme Court of India, challenged an order dated 19.11.2025 passed by its own First Appellate Authority (FAA) under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (“RTI Act”)

The FAA’s order directed the disclosure of examination-related information, including evaluated answer scripts and moderation data, to the Respondent

The Petitioner filed a writ petition directly before the High Court, bypassing the statutory second appeal to the Central Information Commission (“CIC”) under Section 19(3) of the RTI Act

The Petitioner contended that a "public authority," as defined in Section 2(h), is excluded from the ambit of "any person" under Section 19(1) and therefore lacks the locus standi to prefer a statutory appeal

1. Whether the term “person” as used in Section 19 of the RTI Act includes a “public authority,” thereby entitling it to prefer an appeal against the orders of an Information Officer or a First Appellate Authority

2. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable when the Petitioner has not exhausted the statutory remedy of a second appeal before the CIC

The Court primarily applied Section 19(1) and 19(3) of the RTI Act, which provides the mechanism for first and second appeals for "any person" aggrieved by a decision of an Information Officer

It relied on Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which defines "person" to include any company, association, or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not

The court further applied the principle that a Public Information Officer (PIO) functions as an independent quasi-judicial authority separate from the public authority itself

Precedential weight was given to the Karnataka High Court’s decision in GH Sharanappa v. Commissioner, KSIC, which held that the right of appeal belongs to any "aggrieved person", and the Full Bench decision of the CIC in Mrs. Guninder Kaur Gill v. Shri Prabhakar

The Court rejected the Petitioner's argument that a public authority is not a "person" for appellate purposes, noting that Section 19(1) identifies two distinct categories of appellants: those seeking information and any other "person aggrieved"

The Court reasoned that under the RTI Act, the PIO acts as an independent authority whose decisions cannot be automatically attributed to the public authority; hence, the public authority can wear a "different hat" and be legally "aggrieved" by a PIO or FAA’s decision

Referring to Benion on Statutory Interpretation, the Court observed that unless a contrary intention appears, "person" includes juristic entities and bodies corporate

The Court held that the word "person" in Section 19(1) is not restricted to natural persons or information seekers

Consequently, the Petitioner, as a public authority, has the standing to file a second appeal under Section 19(3), rendering the direct writ petition a circumvention of the "carefully designed hierarchical appellate mechanism"

The Court dismissed the writ petition on the grounds that the Petitioner has an efficacious alternate remedy

The Petitioner was granted liberty to prefer a second appeal under Section 19(3) of the RTI Act, with the time spent in the present proceedings to be excluded for the purposes of limitation