Public interest litigation cannot ordinarily be invoked by third parties to direct disciplinary action against individual police officers.

The petitioner, Anand Legal Aid Forum Trust, through its trustee, instituted a writ petition styled as a Public Interest Litigation concerning an alleged police lathi charge in Patna on 8 May 2026.

The petition sought, inter alia, immediate suspension of the SSP, City SP, DSP and SHO concerned; registration of an FIR against police personnel; constitution of a judicial inquiry; preservation of CCTV footage; medical treatment and compensation for injured students; and withdrawal or quashing of an FIR allegedly registered against approximately 5,000 students.

The Court noted that none of the persons allegedly affected by the incident had approached it seeking relief.

Whether a third party could invoke the High Court’s Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction to seek suspension of identified police officers and initiation or supervision of disciplinary action against them.

Whether the Court should entertain the remaining claims concerning alleged victims, medical treatment, compensation, preservation of evidence, and criminal proceedings when no alleged victim had approached the Court.

Whether the writ petition ought to be dismissed on the ground that it sought to make the petitioner a surrogate aggrieved party in relation to disciplinary and criminal proceedings.

Suspension and disciplinary action against government employees fall within the employer’s and competent disciplinary authority’s domain and must ordinarily be dealt with under the applicable service rules; a third party cannot ordinarily invoke the Court’s extraordinary Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction to compel disciplinary action or direct its exercise in a particular manner.

Although Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction is wide, it is controlled by the nature of the grievance and relief sought and cannot be used by a person who is neither the concerned employee nor an alleged victim to assume the role of an aggrieved party and seek supervision of disciplinary or criminal action.

The Court also recognised that a person directly aggrieved by the alleged incident or consequential action remains entitled to pursue an appropriate remedy in accordance with law.

The Court classified the principal reliefs—suspension of named police officers and disciplinary action—as matters arising from the employer–employee relationship.

Since the petitioner was neither the concerned employee nor a directly affected person, it could not use PIL jurisdiction to direct the State to exercise disciplinary powers in a specified manner.

The other reliefs similarly concerned alleged victims and pending or proposed criminal proceedings. The absence of any alleged victim before the Court reinforced the conclusion that the petitioner was attempting to act as a surrogate aggrieved party and obtain judicial supervision of administrative and criminal processes.

Accordingly, the Court declined to examine the factual allegations or grant the requested directions.

The writ petition was dismissed, and any pending applications were also disposed of.

The Court clarified that any person directly aggrieved by the alleged incident or by action taken pursuant to it would remain at liberty to pursue an appropriate remedy before the competent forum in accordance with law.