Public-purpose land-transfer policy warrants no judicial interference absent arbitrariness or statutory violation.

The petitioner sought to prevent the State from disturbing villagers’ possession of land at Mauza Sarsar, recorded as Gair Majarua Malik/Paiti Kadim and associated in the revenue record with the Ajaan Veer Puja Asthal.

He alleged that villagers had worshipped there since time immemorial and that officials were raising boundary walls and proposing construction without acquisition proceedings.

The State responded that, following an inquiry and site inspection, the District Collector had sanctioned transfer of seven kathas for a public purpose, while land was to be left for the Ajaan Veer Asthan; it also stated that no villager had objected during the inquiry.

The petitioner challenged the proposed action by writ petition, invoking, among other provisions, Articles 14, 16, 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

Whether the State’s proposed transfer and use of part of the land for a public purpose warranted judicial interference, given the revenue record’s reference to the Ajaan Veer Puja Asthal and the petitioner’s claim of longstanding public worship.

Whether the petitioner established grounds for restraining the respondents from disturbing possession or changing the nature of the land.

The Court applied the principle that judicial review of a government policy decision concerns the legality of the decision-making process, not the merits or wisdom of the policy; interference is warranted where the decision is, among other things, palpably arbitrary, mala fide, irrational, unconstitutional, beyond statutory authority, or contrary to a statutory provision.

It relied on Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority v. Shakuntala Education & Welfare Society, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 655; Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561; and DDA v. Allottee of SFS Flats, (2008) 2 SCC 672.

The petitioner’s reliance on Articles 14, 16, 25 and 26 was recorded, but the judgment did not separately articulate or apply a distinct test under those provisions.

The Court considered the revenue record and the State’s account of the land-transfer inquiry, including the proposed transfer of seven kathas for a public purpose and the stated reservation of land for the Ajaan Veer Asthan.

It treated the transfer as a policy decision and, applying the limited judicial-review principles in the cited authorities, found no basis to interfere with that decision.

The Court did not separately determine the petitioner’s constitutional claims or make a distinct finding on the asserted history of worship.

The requested restraint against disturbing possession or changing the land’s nature was therefore not granted.