Purchaser pendente lite remains bound by decree despite deletion from suit under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC.

The Petitioner filed a suit in 1987 for possession, declaration, and mesne profits regarding a residential property.

During the pendency of the suit, Respondent No. 2 sold a portion of the property to Respondent No. 7 (R-7) without the leave of the court.

R-7 was initially added as Defendant No. 11 but was later deleted by the Petitioner under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC to prevent trial delays after R-7 sought to re-open the Petitioner's cross-examination.

The suit was ultimately decreed in favor of the Petitioner by the District Court in 2011/2013.

During execution proceedings (Regular Darkhast No. 08 of 2013), the Petitioner filed application Exh. 145-D seeking possession from R-7.

The Executing Court rejected the application on August 19, 2024, holding that because R-7’s name was deleted from the suit, he was not "bound by the decree" under Order 21 Rule 35 of the CPC.

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which codifies the doctrine of lis pendens, stipulating that property cannot be transferred during litigation so as to affect the rights of any party under a decree.

Section 146 of the CPC, which permits proceedings by or against persons claiming under a party to the suit.

Distinction between Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the CPC (striking out improper parties) and Order 23 Rule 1 (abandonment of claims).

Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal (2004) regarding execution against transferees.

Ved Kumari v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (2023) regarding the duty of executing courts to deliver possession despite third-party resistance.

The court found the Executing Court’s reasoning perverse, as it failed to distinguish between procedural deletion and substantive abandonment.

Order 1 Rule 10(2) allows the court to strike out "improper" parties (those not required for adjudication) and does not result in a forfeiture of rights against the subject matter.

Conversely, Order 23 Rule 1 requires an explicit "abandonment" of a claim with no intention of returning to it.

Since R-7 purchased the property pendente lite from a defendant, his title is subservient to the final decree per Section 52 of the TP Act.

The court held that under Section 146 and Order 21 Rule 35 of the CPC, a decree for possession is executable against any person claiming under the judgment debtor.

Deleting R-7 to streamline the trial did not immunize him from the doctrine of lis pendens, as a transferee is always "bound by the decree" regardless of whether they were a formal party at the time the decree was passed.

It held that deletion under Order 1 Rule 10 does not constitute an abandonment of the claim.

R-7, as a purchaser pendente lite, is a person "bound by the decree" under Order 21 Rule 35 CPC.

The court ruled that there is no estoppel against the law and the Petitioner is entitled to execute the decree against R-7.

The Executing Court was directed to allow application Exh. 145-D and conclude the proceedings within six months.