Quashing of charge-sheet refused where allegations of sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage require trial.

The petitioner and the victim were postgraduate students who had been in a romantic relationship for two years.

The victim alleged that on April 14, 2025, the petitioner established physical relations with her by promising marriage, but later refused to marry her and severed communication.

Consequently, an FIR was lodged on October 17, 2025, under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

During the investigation, charges under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act were added.

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR and chargesheet, contending that the relationship was consensual, the FIR was a "counterblast" to his own prior complaint regarding extortion, and that a failed promise to marry does not constitute rape.

By the time of this hearing, the Trial Court had already taken cognizance and framed charges.

Whether the criminal proceedings, including the FIR and chargesheet, should be quashed on the grounds that the physical relationship was consensual and lacked "false promise" from inception.

Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS (482 Cr.P.C.) to interfere at the stage where trial has already commenced.

The court considered Section 69 of the BNS, which penalizes sexual intercourse by "deceitful means" or promise to marry without intention to fulfill it.

It referenced Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act regarding offences committed against members of scheduled castes.

The petitioner relied on precedents *Nitin B. Nikhare v. State of Maharashtra* (2025) and *Smadhan v. State of Maharashtra* (2025), which establish that consensual physical relations do not amount to rape unless a promise to marry was false from its very inception.

The Court's primary procedural framework was Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), which governs the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of process.

The Court noted that the matter had progressed significantly; a chargesheet had been filed, cognizance was taken, and charges were framed by the Special Judge.

The Court observed that the allegations—centering on sexual intercourse under the pretext of marriage—are "heinous in nature" and involve factual disputes that cannot be adjudicated in a summary quashing proceeding.

While the petitioner argued that the delay in FIR and the nature of the relationship suggested a lack of criminality, the Bench held that such claims are matters of evidence to be "tested during trial".

The Court found no "exceptional or compelling circumstance" to bypass the trial process, especially since the trial had already reached the stage of deposition.

It declined to quash the FIR, chargesheet, or the order framing charges, concluding that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS should not be exercised when the trial is already underway and the allegations require a full evidentiary examination.

The petition was dismissed.