Quashing Refused as Allegations of Offensive Social Media Posts Against Public Figures Disclose Cognizable Offences

The petitioner, an Army Sepoy, was charged under Sections 294, 504, 505(1)(b) of the IPC and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, for allegedly posting a WhatsApp status containing abusive and derogatory remarks against the then Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh.

The complaint alleged that the post related to a Naxalite incident and was intended to incite public anger and disturb communal harmony.

The petitioner moved the High Court under Section 528 of the BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC) to quash the FIR, charge sheet, and the order of cognizance, arguing that the post was an inadvertent technical error caused by mental stress and that the investigation lacked primary electronic evidence.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings when the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclose a cognizable offence?

2. Whether factual defenses, such as a "technical error" or "lack of intent," can be adjudicated in a quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC/Section 528 BNSS?

The Court applied the settled principles of inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS (Section 482 CrPC), which permit interference only if the allegations do not disclose an offence or are maliciously instituted.

It relied on Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, establishing that the power to quash should be used sparingly in "rarest of rare cases" and that the court cannot inquire into the reliability or merits of allegations at this stage.

It cited State Represented by the Inspector of Police v. M. Maridoss, affirming that the High Court is not required to conduct a "mini-trial" or weigh evidence during quashing proceedings.

The Court reasoned that the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, clearly suggest the commission of cognizable offences involving the public circulation of derogatory remarks against a public figure, which potentially disturbs public peace.

The Court rejected the petitioner's arguments regarding "technical errors" and "mental stress," characterizing them as disputed questions of fact that require a formal trial for the appreciation of evidence.

Regarding the alleged evidentiary gaps (lack of original electronic devices), the Court held that such deficiencies pertain to the evidentiary value of the material at trial and do not constitute a valid ground for quashing at the threshold.

The petitioner’s claims were deemed matters for trial rather than summary dismissal. The petition was dismissed without costs.