Quasi-judicial officer's erroneous decisions, absent mala fide, are not misconduct for disciplinary action.

The applicant, Lalu Prasad Yadav, an Income Tax Officer, was issued a Charge Memorandum dated 04.03.2022 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The charges alleged that during FYs 2014-2015 and 2016-2017, while posted as ITO, Ward No. 8, Vapi, he failed to maintain assessment records properly per Para 3.4.5 (Chapter 2) of the Manual of Office Procedure (Vol. II) and completed assessments without due diligence, violating Rule 3(1) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

The applicant claimed the disciplinary proceedings were initiated with malicious intent by Respondent No. 6, Shri Satbir Singh, a former Pr. CIT, Valsad, against whom the applicant had signed a resolution.

The applicant submitted a detailed reply to a vigilance communication in 2020 and subsequently, a representation dated 18.04.2022 denying the charges.

The disciplinary authority appointed an Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer on 07.09.2022.

The applicant contended that his actions were performed in his capacity as a "quasi-judicial authority" and a mere error of fact or law cannot be the basis for disciplinary proceedings.

1. Whether the Charge Memorandum dated 04.03.2022 and subsequent orders for disciplinary proceedings are legally sustainable given that the alleged misconduct relates to duties performed by the applicant in a quasi-judicial capacity?

2. Whether disciplinary proceedings can be initiated for alleged procedural irregularities or errors of judgment by an officer discharging quasi-judicial functions, in the absence of mala fide, recklessness, or corrupt motive?

3. Whether the impugned Charge Memorandum and subsequent proceedings are vitiated by delay and malicious intent?

The Tribunal applied the principles governing judicial review of disciplinary proceedings, emphasizing that interference is warranted only for patent illegality, perversity, statutory violations, or breach of natural justice, not merely for possible factual disagreement.

It relied on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in `B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749]` and `State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Umesh [(2022) 2 SCC (L&S) 321]` regarding the limited scope of judicial review.

The core legal principle applied was that disciplinary action against an officer for actions taken in a quasi-judicial capacity is not maintainable unless there is compelling evidence of mala fide, corrupt motive, recklessness, or extraneous considerations, rather than mere errors of judgment or law.

This principle was specifically drawn from the CAT, Principal Bench, in `S. Rajguru v. UOI (OA 2815/2012)`, upheld by the Delhi High Court in `UOI v. S. Rajguru (W.P. (C) No.5113/2014)`, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in `SLP(C) No. 33895/2014`.

The Tribunal also noted the stand of the Income Tax Department before the Supreme Court that the `Manual of Office Procedure` is not binding instructions under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Tribunal found that the charges against the applicant predominantly concerned the correctness of his decisions or procedural lapses while acting as an Assessing Officer, a role recognized as quasi-judicial under Section 2(7A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Citing `S. Rajguru` (supra), the Tribunal reiterated that errors of law or fact made in a quasi-judicial capacity, without allegations of mala fide, corrupt motive, recklessness, or extraneous considerations, cannot form the basis for disciplinary proceedings.

The charges framed against the applicant were purely based on the alleged erroneous nature of his decisions and alleged failure to follow the Manual of Office Procedure, which the department itself held was not binding.

Crucially, the respondents failed to address whether the applicant’s duties were quasi-judicial or to counter the specific allegations of malicious intent by Respondent No. 6, who did not file a reply despite being served notice.

The Tribunal underscored that allowing disciplinary action for mere erroneous decisions by quasi-judicial authorities would instill fear and undermine independent functioning.

Since no bribery, corrupt motive, or personal gain was alleged, the charges essentially amounted to appealable errors, not disciplinary misconduct.

Therefore, the foundation of the disciplinary proceedings was legally infirm, as it was based solely on alleged "assessments" made by the applicant in a quasi-judicial capacity without allegations of mala fide.

It held that disciplinary proceedings founded solely on alleged procedural irregularities or errors of judgment in quasi-judicial acts, without clear allegations of mala fide, recklessness, or extraneous considerations, are vitiated and not sustainable in the eye of law.

Consequently, the Original Application was allowed, and the impugned Charge Memorandum dated 04.03.2022 (Annex. A/1) was quashed and set aside.

The interim order staying the effect and operation of the impugned orders was made absolute.