Rape conviction affirmed, but life sentence modified to 21 years’ imprisonment already undergone.

On 11 May 2001, the four-year-old victim was allegedly taken by the appellant, Pooran, to a mango grove on the pretext of plucking mangoes, where he sexually assaulted her. Her father, Shree Ram, and Chhotey Lal allegedly reached the spot on hearing her alarm and saw the appellant fleeing; the victim was found bleeding.

The FIR under Section 376 IPC was registered at 7:20 p.m. on the same day, approximately eight hours after the alleged occurrence.

The victim’s undergarment was seized and sealed, and medical examination disclosed a torn hymen, blood clots and blood-stained clothes; forensic examination reportedly detected human blood, semen and spermatozoa on the garment.

The prosecution examined the victim, her father, the formal witnesses, the medical officer, the radiologist and the investigating officer.

The Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi, convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment on 5 April 2002.

The appellant challenged both his conviction and sentence in the present appeal.

Whether the testimony of the victim, a child witness, was legally competent and sufficiently reliable to sustain the appellant’s conviction under Section 376 IPC?

Whether the testimony of the victim’s father and the medical and forensic evidence established the commission of rape beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the alleged contradictions in the prosecution evidence?

Whether the delay in lodging the FIR and the alleged delay in forwarding the special report to the Magistrate rendered the prosecution case unreliable?

Whether the sentence of life imprisonment required modification in view of the appellant’s having undergone approximately 21 years of incarceration?

The Court applied Section 376 IPC, as applicable to the 2001 offence, governing punishment for rape.

Under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child is competent to testify if capable of understanding questions and giving rational answers; corroboration of a child witness is a rule of prudence, not an inflexible legal requirement, as recognised in Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341.

Relying on Pradeep v. State of Haryana, (2023) 19 SCC 221, the Court reiterated that the trial court should conduct and record a preliminary assessment of a child witness’s ability to understand questions and give rational answers.

On FIR transmission, the Court relied on Pala Singh v. State of Punjab, (1972) 2 SCC 640, State of Rajasthan v. Daud Khan, (2016) 2 SCC 607, and Guiram Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 15 SCC 284, for the principle that delay in receipt or forwarding of the FIR does not by itself vitiate the prosecution where the FIR was promptly recorded, the investigation commenced on its basis, the evidence is otherwise credible, and no prejudice is shown.

The Court found the victim competent because the trial court had put preliminary questions to her and recorded its satisfaction regarding her capacity to understand and answer rationally.

Her testimony specifically attributed the assault to the appellant and remained materially consistent in cross-examination.

The father’s evidence was treated as reliable because he had reached the spot on hearing the victim’s alarm, saw the appellant fleeing while fastening his undergarment, and found the victim bleeding; the Court held that this was not merely hearsay evidence.

The medical evidence of genital injury and blood, together with the forensic findings on the victim’s undergarment, corroborated the ocular account and negatived the defence theory that the injuries resulted from a fall on a field boundary.

The eight-hour interval before registration of the FIR was adequately explained by the father’s testimony and was not considered fatal.

Although the special report was allegedly forwarded late, the Court held that no prejudice to the appellant had been demonstrated and that the delay could not override the otherwise credible evidence.

Accordingly, the conviction was found neither perverse nor legally infirm.

The Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction under Section 376 IPC, holding that the prosecution had proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt through the credible testimony of the victim and her father, supported by medical and forensic evidence.

However, considering that the offence dated back to 2001 and that the appellant had undergone approximately 21 years of imprisonment, the Court modified the sentence from life imprisonment to 21 years’ imprisonment, stated to be the period already undergone.

The appeal was accordingly partly allowed; as the appellant was already on bail, he was not required to surrender, and his bail bonds and sureties were cancelled and discharged.