Reasonable requirement to start a business may be established through oral evidence alone.

The plaintiffs/respondents instituted an eviction suit against the defendant/appellant on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises for running a shop.

The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed the decree.

The defendant preferred the present second appeal, contending that the finding of reasonable requirement was based only on the evidence of PW1 and that PW1 had admitted that he neither possessed a trade licence nor intended to conduct business.

The delay in depositing deficit court-fees was condoned, and the appeal was taken up under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Whether the courts below erred in decreeing eviction on the ground of the plaintiffs’ reasonable requirement of the suit premises for running a shop?

Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below were perverse or gave rise to any substantial question of law warranting interference in second appeal?

Whether the appellant was entitled to time to vacate the suit premises subject to furnishing an undertaking?

The Court applied Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which a second appeal may be dismissed at the admission stage where no substantial question of law arises.

It also applied the settled principle governing eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement that the landlord’s bona fide requirement is not to be dictated or assessed according to the preferences of the tenant or the court.

Where the landlord pleads a need to commence a business from the tenanted premises and proves that requirement, oral evidence may suffice; the landlord need not additionally establish immediate business readiness, trade licence, business acumen, or other prerequisites for commencing the business.

Concurrent factual findings of the courts below will not ordinarily be interfered with in second appeal absent perversity or a substantial question of law.

The Court construed the evidence of PW1 as establishing that the suit premises were required not for PW1 personally to conduct business, but for his wife to run a shop.

Therefore, PW1’s admission that he did not possess a trade licence in his own name did not undermine the pleaded requirement.

The Court held that the absence of a trade licence or an immediate demonstrated capacity to commence business was not decisive, since the plaintiffs’ requirement could be proved through oral evidence and the tenant could not dictate the manner in which the premises should be used.

As both courts had concurrently found, on the evidence, that the plaintiffs reasonably required the premises for running a business, the High Court found no perversity and no substantial question of law requiring admission of the second appeal.

CAN 1 of 2024 and CAN 2 of 2024 were also dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The appellant’s request for time to vacate was left open for consideration by the executing court upon an appropriate application and undertaking; the executing court was directed to decide such application on its merits after hearing both parties.