Recommendations of Internal Complaints Committee under the POSH Act are mandatory and binding on employers.

The petitioners were members of an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted on July 28, 2025, to investigate a sexual harassment complaint against a delinquent officer.

Despite instructions to submit a report within one day, the ICC conducted proceedings, recorded testimonies (including a Joint Commissioner's statement), and submitted a report on July 31, 2025, exonerating the delinquent.

Following the report, the complainant submitted an audio recording alleging the ICC was hostile and partisan.

Subsequently, the delinquent was suspended on August 3, 2025, and the petitioners (ICC members) were also suspended via impugned orders dated August 5 and 6, 2025, pending departmental inquiries for allegedly making a concerted effort to shield the delinquent.

1. Whether recommendations of the Internal Complaint Committee made in terms of Section 13(3) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013, are mandatory or directory?

2. Whether the impugned orders of suspension from service are in consonance with Rule 4 of the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999?

The Court applied Sections 11, 13, 18, and 26 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (Act of 2013) along with Rules 7 and 9 of the 2013 Rules, noting that the ICC’s findings on misconduct are conclusive for the employer.

It relied on May George v. Special Tehsildar for the test of mandatory vs. directory provisions [para 29] and Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India for purposive statutory interpretation.

Regarding disciplinary action against quasi-judicial authorities, the Court followed Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan [para 49], Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India [para 50], and Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of M.P. [para 53], which establish that such officers cannot be punished for erroneous decisions unless there is prima facie evidence of "culpable negligence," "extraneous considerations," or "corrupt motive."

Rule 4 of the U.P. Government Servants Rules, 1999, was applied, requiring suspension only for charges warranting a major penalty.

Regarding Issue A, the Court held that since the Act of 2013 provides for an appeal specifically against ICC recommendations (Section 18) and penalizes employers for non-implementation (Section 26), the recommendations are mandatory and not merely directory.

Regarding Issue B, the Court observed that an ICC acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Citing K.K. Dhawan, the Court reasoned that the disciplinary authority must distinguish between the "correctness" of a decision and the "conduct" of the officer.

The Court found that the State exerted undue pressure by demanding a report within 24 hours while the law grants 90 days.

The Court analyzed the impugned suspension orders and found them "cursory," lacking any recorded "subjective satisfaction" or prima facie finding that the petitioners acted with extraneous motives rather than just making an error in judgment.

However, it answered Issue B in favor of the petitioners, ruling that the suspension was improper.

The Court quashed the suspension orders dated August 5 and 6, 2025, via a writ of Certiorari, granting the State liberty to pass fresh orders only if they record a specific prima facie satisfaction regarding the petitioners' conduct/motives as distinct from the legality of their report. The writ petitions were allowed.