Regional rural bank employees do not hold civil posts protected by Article 311.

The petitioner, a JMG Scale-I Probationary Officer appointed by the Bank’s Chairman, was removed from service on 30 December 2016 after a departmental inquiry found him responsible for misconduct involving the transfer of ₹40,00,000 from a cash-credit account.

His statutory appeal was dismissed as time-barred on 31 December 2018.

In an earlier writ petition, the High Court had directed that the inquiry should not commence without the Court’s leave. That petition was dismissed for default, restored, and later dismissed again in 2024, when any interim order was expressly vacated.

The petitioner’s initial challenge to his removal succeeded on the ground that the General Manager was subordinate to the appointing authority; on appeal, that judgment was set aside and the writ petition restored for consideration of, among other matters, whether Article 311 applied to a Bank employee.

The petitioner then relied on Article 311 and the earlier interim order as grounds to invalidate the removal.

Whether Article 311(1) of the Constitution prohibited the General Manager from removing the petitioner because the Bank’s Chairman had appointed him.

Whether the departmental proceedings and removal order were invalid because the inquiry proceeded without leave of the Court, contrary to the interim order in the earlier writ petition.

Article 311(1) protects members of specified civil services and holders of civil posts under the Union or a State from removal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority.

In S.L. Agarwal v. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 177, the Supreme Court held that employees of a separately constituted corporation do not, merely by virtue of that employment, hold civil posts under the Government or receive Article 311 protection.

The Bank’s Officers and Employees Service Regulations, 2010, as amended, designate the General Manager as the competent disciplinary authority for Scale-I and Scale-II officers.

Under Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese, (2004) 6 SCC 378, interlocutory orders may ordinarily revive when a proceeding dismissed for default is restored, unless the restoration order or other circumstances indicate otherwise.

In disciplinary matters, courts do not reappreciate evidence where the inquiry was fair and findings are supported by evidence, but may intervene for violations of natural justice or statutory rules, perversity, or other recognised grounds; punishment is not ordinarily interfered with unless it shocks the conscience.

The Court held that the petitioner was an employee of a Regional Rural Bank, not a holder of a civil post under the Union or a State, and therefore could not invoke Article 311.

The applicable service regulations made the General Manager the competent disciplinary authority for a Scale-I officer, so the fact that the Chairman had issued the appointment letter did not invalidate the removal order.

As to the earlier interim order, the Court considered the inquiry record, including notices to the petitioner, his non-appearance, and the opportunities afforded to him.

It concluded that the petitioner had not established that the disciplinary authority or inquiry officer proceeded with knowledge of, and in wilful disobedience to, the Court’s direction such that the proceedings became a nullity.

The Court also noted that the petitioner did not pursue the earlier writ petition, the inquiry concluded in 2016, and his statutory appeal was filed after substantial delay.

Finding no merit in the challenge to the disciplinary and appellate orders, the Court dismissed W.P.A. 10285 of 2019; any connected applications were also disposed of.