Registered transferees may build on disputed property, but remain restrained from alienating it.

The plaintiffs filed a suit for partition and separate possession, including a claim that a 2012 gift of the ‘B’ schedule property was not binding on their rights.

Defendant No. 1 had gifted the property to Defendant No. 2, who later gifted it to the appellants, Defendant Nos. 10 and 11.

The appellants relied on the registered gift deeds and asserted that they were in possession and undertaking construction on the property.

The plaintiffs obtained temporary injunctions restraining the appellants from alienating or encumbering the property and from changing its nature.

The appellants challenged that order in this appeal.

1. Whether the trial court’s temporary injunction restraining the appellants from alienating the ‘B’ schedule property should be disturbed

2. Whether the injunction restraining the appellants from encumbering or changing the nature of the property, including by putting up construction, should be sustained

The Court applied Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Section 151 CPC.

An application for temporary injunction requires consideration of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and the comparative risk of irreparable injury or hardship.

The Court also stated that a registered instrument gives rise to a presumption that the property is vested in the named person unless the instrument is set aside in accordance with law.

The Court noted that the property had passed under two registered gift deeds and that the appellants were undertaking construction after demolishing an earlier shed.

The plaintiffs’ claim that the property was joint-family property, and the validity and effect of the gift deeds, remained matters for trial; the Court did not determine title at the interlocutory stage.

It concluded that restraining the appellants from construction would cause them greater hardship, particularly given the registered deeds, while the plaintiffs’ rights could be adjudicated in the suit.

However, it agreed that the appellants should remain restrained from alienating the property pending the suit.

The injunction under IA No. 10 was set aside insofar as it restrained the appellants from encumbering or changing the nature of the property.

The injunction under IA No. 9 restraining alienation was sustained.

The Court expressed no opinion on the merits, and left all contentions open.