Registering Authorities Lack Jurisdiction to Cancel Registered Sale Deeds Under Administrative Power Even for Fraud or Impersonation

The petitioner challenged an order dated 24.09.2016 passed by the Assistant Inspector General (AIG) of Registration, Gorakhpur, which cancelled a registered sale deed dated 12.07.2016.

The cancellation followed a complaint by respondent Jang Bahadur, who alleged that his brother, Firangi Prasad, had impersonated him to sell ancestral land to the petitioner (Firangi’s wife).

The AIG cancelled the deed based on a fact-finding inquiry by the Deputy Registrar and powers purportedly granted by Government Order (G.O.) dated 13.08.2013.

The petitioner contended that registering authorities become functus officio after registration and lack the jurisdiction to cancel documents.

1. Whether a registering authority or superior administrative officer has the jurisdiction to cancel a duly registered sale deed under the Registration Act, 1908, even on allegations of fraud or impersonation.

2. Whether an action taken under a Government Order remains valid if that Government Order is subsequently quashed by a High Court.

The court primarily applied the Registration Act, 1908, and the principles established by the Full Bench in Smt. Kusum Lata v. State of U.P. (2018), which held that registering authorities lack administrative power to cancel deeds once registered.

It further relied on Krishna Kumar Saxena v. State of U.P. (2018), which specifically quashed the Government Order dated 13.08.2013 as being "wholly without jurisdiction" and "arbitrary," affirming that only a competent civil court can declare a registered document null and void.

The court reasoned that once a sale deed is registered, the registering authority becomes functus officio and ceases to have any jurisdiction over the document.

Applying the Full Bench ruling in Kusum Lata, the court observed that even in cases of alleged impersonation or fraud, the validity of a registered instrument is a matter of fact that must be adjudicated by a civil court through oral and documentary evidence, not through administrative inquiries.

Regarding the respondents' defense that the G.O. dated 13.08.2013 was valid at the time the impugned order was passed, the court held this argument "misconceived" and ruled that once a Government Order is quashed for being jurisdictionaly deficient, any actions previously taken under its umbrella cannot survive.

The writ petition was allowed, and the impugned order dated 24.09.2016 was quashed, while clarifying that respondents remain at liberty to seek appropriate civil remedies before a competent court.