Registrar may suo motu initiate Section 32 inquiries without prior material or recorded satisfaction.

The petitioner-society challenged the order dated 7 May 2025 passed by the Assistant Registrar initiating an enquiry under Section 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, concerning the society’s constitution, working and affairs.

In earlier proceedings, the High Court had disposed of W.P. No. 11458/2024 on 29 April 2024, granting liberty to raise the election-related dispute before the Registrar under Section 64(2)(V).

In W.A. No. 2550/2024, the Division Bench permitted the concerned party to seek review for correction of the statutory reference.

The review petition was thereafter allowed on 3 April 2025 to the limited extent that “Section 64(2)(V)” was to be read as “Section 32” and “Election Petition” as “dispute”.

Relying on the review order, the Assistant Registrar initiated suo motu proceedings under Section 32.

The petitioner contended that the order was non-speaking, that the statutory prerequisites had not been examined, and that no prior opportunity of hearing had been granted.

The State and private respondents defended the order, asserting that Section 32 expressly empowered the Registrar to initiate an enquiry suo motu and that the petitioner had an appellate remedy under Section 40.

The Court applied Section 32(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973, which permits the Registrar, on his own motion or on an application, to order an enquiry into the constitution, working and financial condition of a society.

Section 32(2) prescribes the affidavit-supported application requirement where the enquiry is sought by a majority of the governing body or at least one-third of the society’s members; this requirement does not govern a suo motu enquiry.

Section 32(3) confers investigative powers upon the Registrar or authorised person, while Section 32(4) requires communication of the enquiry result and permits appropriate directions to the society.

Section 40 provides an appeal against orders of subordinate officers to the Registrar and, in specified cases, to the State Government.

Relying on W.P. No. 11109/2021, decided on 1 November 2022, the Court held that Section 32 does not require the Registrar to collect preliminary material or record a prior finding before exercising suo motu jurisdiction.

The Court also referred to W.P. No. 21819/2015, decided on 28 March 2017, concerning the affidavit requirement for applications under Section 32(2), and W.P. No. 23026/2026, decided on 3 July 2026, in relation to the principles governing representation and litigation by an association.

The Court found that the review order had expressly corrected the earlier statutory reference and directed that the dispute be considered under Section 32.

On a plain reading of Section 32(1), the Registrar possessed independent suo motu authority to initiate an enquiry; the statutory requirement of an affidavit applied only where an application was made under Section 32(2), not where proceedings were initiated by the Registrar on his own motion.

The Court therefore rejected the petitioner’s argument that the authority first had to establish jurisdictional facts, collect evidence, or record a preliminary satisfaction.

The absence of a prior hearing did not invalidate the initiation of the enquiry because the petitioner would have an adequate opportunity to participate and contest the relevant issues during the enquiry.

The Court further held that the impugned order was consistent with the earlier writ and review orders and disclosed no arbitrariness, illegality, impropriety, or violation of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226.

Although the alternative remedy under Section 40 was considered persuasive, the petition was dismissed principally on merits.

Any procedural or factual objections could be raised during the enquiry, where the petitioner would have an opportunity to present its case.

Finding no jurisdictional error, illegality, arbitrariness, or breach of natural justice, the Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and dismissed W.P. No. 17458 of 2025.