Registrars Cannot Refuse Registration Merely on Suspicion or Decide Title Disputes, Madras High Court Rules

M/s. Pioneer Engineering Syndicate presented an irrevocable general power of attorney dated 11.04.2025 for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Annur.

The Sub-Registrar issued a refusal check slip dated 12.05.2025, signed on 14.05.2025, citing discrepancies in the partnership firm’s parent documents relating to ownership and the non-production of the original document.

The District Registrar dismissed the firm’s appeal by order dated 18.09.2025.

In W.P. No. 41300 of 2025, the learned Single Judge set aside the refusal and appellate orders and directed registration of the power of attorney upon re-presentation.

The Registration Department challenged that order in the present writ appeal.

The Court applied Section 22-B of the Registration Act, 1908, which permits the registering officer to refuse registration of forged documents, transactions prohibited by law, documents concerning properties attached by a competent authority, and documents covered by notified statutory restrictions.

However, refusal under that provision must be based on clear and conclusive material rather than mere suspicion.

The Court relied on R. Kathirvel v. Inspector General of Registration, 2024 (4) LW 110, for the principle that adjudication of fraud, forgery and civil title disputes is primarily for a civil court.

The Court relied on K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, (2026) 2 SCC 696, recognising that title adjudication requiring examination of oral and documentary evidence is outside the jurisdiction of the registering authority.

The Court distinguished the preventive power under Section 22-B from the former cancellation power under Section 77-A, while holding that the same limitation against executive adjudication of disputed civil rights applied in the present context.

The Court held that the authorities had relied only on suspicion arising from the partnership deeds, the firm’s registration in Telangana, the timing of the board resolution and the absence of the original document.

Those circumstances did not constitute undisputed and conclusive proof that the power of attorney was forged, illegal or otherwise covered by Section 22-B.

Determining whether the partnership firm had title, whether the firm had been validly reconstituted, and whether the two partners were competent to execute the power of attorney would require consideration of oral and documentary evidence and, where necessary, forensic examination—functions belonging to a civil court and not to the registering authority.

Accordingly, the refusal to register could not be sustained.

Nevertheless, to protect the Registration Department if a competent court or statutory authority later determined that the firm lacked title or that the partners lacked authority, the Court imposed an indemnity condition and permitted consequential cancellation.

The writ appeal was disposed of by modifying the Single Judge’s order: the firm was directed to re-present the power of attorney within two weeks; it was required to submit an indemnity letter along with the re-presentation; and the Sub-Registrar was directed to complete registration within three days after fulfilment of the imposed conditions.

The indemnity had to authorise the Registration Department to cancel the power of attorney without prior notice if a competent court or statutory authority subsequently found that the firm or its partners lacked title or authority to present the document.

No costs were awarded and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.