Registration of a second ECIR for distinct scheduled offences and larger conspiracy does not constitute impermissible reinvestigation.

The petitioner, a Director of M/S Reliable Infra Services Private Limited, was subjected to search and seizure by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) on 16.07.2024 under ECIR/PTZO/4/2024 (ECIR-4), which originated from an FIR involving allegations of rape and cheating against public servants.

Subsequently, based on petitioner’s statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, the ED shared information with state authorities under Section 66(2).

This led to a "Second FIR" and "Third FIR" (PS Case No. 05/2025) alleging a larger conspiracy of rigging government tenders and bribery.

Consequently, ED registered a new ECIR/PTZO/13/2025 (ECIR-13).

The petitioner sought quashing of ECIR-13, quashing of summons, and quashing of his prior statements (dated July–October 2024), arguing they were self-incriminating and obtained through coercion.

1. Whether an ECIR is a statutory document akin to an FIR and maintainable for quashing under Article 226

2. Whether the registration of a second ECIR (ECIR-13) on the same factual substratum as ECIR-4 is legally permissible

3. Whether statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA are hit by the bar against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) or require "Miranda Warnings" and Section 164 CrPC safeguards

4. Whether a private individual can be prosecuted for PMLA offences arising from the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act

The Court relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1, which established that ECIR is an internal department document, not a statutory one, and that PMLA authorities are not "police officers," rendering Article 20(3) of the Constitution and Section 25 of the Evidence Act inapplicable to Section 50 statements.

It applied Section 66(2) of the PMLA regarding the mandatory duty to share information with other agencies.

It further cited Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254 regarding the "test of sameness" for second FIRs.

The court cited State v. Jitender Kumar Singh (2014) 11 SCC 724, confirming that private individuals can be tried for PC Act offences.

The Court reasoned that since an ECIR is an internal document and not a statutory one, it cannot be quashed like an FIR under Article 226 unless the predicate offence itself is quashed.

Regarding "evergreening," the Court found that ECIR-13 was distinct from ECIR-4 as it involved different scheduled offences and a larger conspiracy unearthed during the investigation.

The Court rejected the "Miranda Rights" argument, holding that the Indian legal system provides sufficient statutory safeguards and that Section 164(4) CrPC apply only to "accused" persons, whereas the petitioner was not yet formally arraigned when his statements were recorded.

The Court further noted that further investigation does not require prior judicial permission unless the trial has commenced, and that the ED was legally obligated under Section 66(2) to share incriminating data with the Vigilance Unit.

The Court dismissed the writ petition and all interim reliefs and challenges to the summons were rejected.