Registration of FIR against a Judicial Officer requires prior permission of the Chief Justice of the High Court.

The petitioner, a Senior Deputy Collector, lodged an FIR (Kazi Mohammadpur P.S. Case No. 122/2024) against his wife, a serving Judicial Officer (Opposite Party No. 2).

He alleged that on 26.03.2023, while he was on official duty for the Governor’s visit, the OP No. 2 assaulted him, used vulgar language, and obstructed his official duties.

The petitioner initially sought permission from the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to register the FIR but received no formal reply.

Following a legal opinion from the District Prosecution Officer suggesting permission was unnecessary for acts done in a personal capacity, the FIR was registered.

However, the police submitted a "final form" citing an "error of law" because prior permission from the Chief Justice was not obtained.

The Magistrate accepted this final form on 13.05.2024, which the petitioner challenged in the present application.

1. Whether the Magistrate erred in accepting the police's final form which concluded that the FIR against a Judicial Officer was an "error of law" due to lack of prior permission from the Chief Justice.

2. Whether prior permission from the Chief Justice of the High Court is mandatory to register an FIR against a Judicial Officer for alleged criminal conduct, even if the acts are claimed to be personal in nature.

The court primarily applied the guidelines established by the Supreme Court in *Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat* (1991) 4 SCC 406 and *U.P. Judicial Officers’ Association v. Union of India* (1994) 4 SCC 687, which mandate that no criminal investigation or FIR shall be registered against a Judicial Officer without the prior permission of the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court.

The court also distinguished *K. Veeraswami v. Union of India* (1991) 3 SCC 622 regarding the consultation process for higher judiciary judges.

The court rejected the petitioner's argument that permission is unnecessary for cognizable offenses committed in a personal capacity.

It reasoned that the protection granted to Judicial Officers is a settled legal principle intended to safeguard judicial independence.

The court observed that the petitioner had indeed applied for permission from the Hon’ble Chief Justice, but the High Court's administrative side, after reviewing reports from the District Judge and the officer’s explanation, had already decided that "no further action is required".

Consequently, the police's determination that the FIR constituted an "error of law" was legally sound because the mandatory procedural safeguard—prior permission from the Chief Justice—was absent.

The court found that the Magistrate’s order was not mechanical but based on these established legal requirements.

The High Court upheld the Magistrate's order dated 13.05.2024 accepting the final form and dismissed the petitioner's application for quashing.