Regularisation reference cannot be summarily dismissed while termination legality remains pending.

The respondent-Union initiated Reference IT No. 170 of 2018 before the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad, seeking permanency and regularisation of services for 159 workers of Tata Motors.

During the reference, Tata Motors filed Exhibit 19 seeking dismissal of the reference insofar as it concerned 72 workers, contending that their fixed-term contracts had expired before the reference date, 28 September 2018, and that they were no longer in its employment.

The Union opposed the application and stated that the 72 workers had separately challenged their termination in pending reference proceedings before the Labour Court.

By order dated 3 July 2025, the Industrial Tribunal rejected Exhibit 19, holding that the nature and legality of the cessation of employment required adjudication after evidence.

Tata Motors challenged that order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal erred in refusing to dismiss, at the threshold, the regularisation and permanency reference concerning 72 workers who were allegedly no longer employed by Tata Motors.

2. Whether, when the legality of the termination or cessation of employment of those workers was itself pending adjudication, the reference could be rejected without recording evidence.

3. Whether the High Court should interfere under its supervisory jurisdiction with an interlocutory order of the Industrial Tribunal concerning a preliminary objection.

The Court applied the principle in Oshiar Prasad v. Employees in relation to the Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2015) 4 SCC 71, that absorption or regularisation can ordinarily be claimed only while the contract of employment subsists; after termination or expiry of the contract, the employer–employee relationship ends, except for determining the legality of that termination.

However, where termination is disputed and its legality is pending adjudication, that issue must first be determined and cannot be presumed against the workmen.

Relying on Dena Bank v. D.V. Kundadia, 2011 (III) CLR 415, the Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction should generally not be exercised against interlocutory orders of Labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals.

It also applied the principle in D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration, (1983) 4 SCC 293, that industrial tribunals should ordinarily decide all issues together rather than allowing preliminary objections to delay adjudication of the substantive industrial dispute, and that High Courts should avoid interfering at interlocutory stages.

Although Oshiar Prasad supports the proposition that regularisation cannot ordinarily be claimed after the employment relationship has conclusively ended, the Court distinguished its application because, in the present case, the 72 workers’ termination or cessation of employment was itself under challenge in separate pending proceedings.

There was no material before the Tribunal conclusively establishing whether the workers had lawfully ceased to be employed on expiry of their contracts or had been terminated by Tata Motors.

Since the outcome of the termination references could affect whether the employment relationship was legally treated as continuing or restored, dismissal of the regularisation reference at the threshold would be premature.

The Tribunal was therefore justified in requiring adjudication on evidence.

Further, the impugned order was interlocutory and did not finally determine the merits; consistent with Dena Bank and D.P. Maheshwari, the High Court declined to interrupt the pending industrial proceedings.

The regularisation and permanency reference concerning the 72 workers could not be dismissed at the threshold while the legality of their termination or cessation of employment remained pending adjudication.

The petition was dismissed, Rule was discharged, and no relief was granted to Tata Motors.