Reinstatement order implies continuity of service as a matter of law unless expressly denied.

The petitioner was employed as a daily wager in 1985 and was terminated in March 1999

The Labour Court, via an award dated 05.06.2008, directed his reinstatement without backwages, which was confirmed by the High Court on 24.12.2012

He was reinstated on 07.06.2013

By an order dated 07.09.2020, the respondents granted him benefits under the Government Resolution (GR) dated 17.10.1988, but calculated his service starting only from his 2013 reinstatement date rather than his initial 1985 appointment, thus denying him "continuity of service"

The petitioner challenged this calculation, seeking benefits based on his total length of service

1. Whether an award of reinstatement by a Labour Court implies "continuity of service" as a matter of law even if the term is not expressly mentioned in the award

2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988 by counting his service from the initial date of appointment

The Court applied the principle that reinstatement following the setting aside of an illegal termination inherently includes "continuity of service" unless expressly denied by the adjudicating authority

This doctrine was derived from the Supreme Court precedents in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab & Haryana (2002) 9 SCC 492 and Nandkishore Shravan Ahirrao v. Kosan Industries (P) Ltd. AIR 2020 SC 1776

State’s Government Resolution dated 17.10.1988, which provides for pay fixation and retirement benefits for daily wagers based on their length of continuous service

The Court reasoned that reinstatement is not a "fresh appointment" but a restoration of the original service status

Relying on Nandkishore Shravan Ahirrao, the Court held that since the Labour Court’s 2008 award did not specifically deny continuity of service, such continuity must be read into the award as a matter of law

The Court rejected the respondents' approach of treating the 2013 reinstatement as the starting point for benefits, noting that the petitioner was forced into unemployment due to an illegal termination and the employer cannot benefit from its own wrong

It emphasized that "continuity of service" is a direct and inherent consequence of reinstatement

Consequently, the petitioner’s entire tenure from 1985 must be considered for computing benefits under the 1988 Resolution

It held that the petitioner is entitled to continuity of service from his initial date of appointment

The respondents were directed to: (1) extend the benefits of the Resolution dated 17.10.1988 treating service as continuous from the initial appointment date; (2) calculate these benefits and pay them within 12 weeks; and (3) pay all consequential benefits from 31st October 2024 onwards