Rejection of Plaint for Specific Performance where Failure to Disclose Refusal of NA Permission Evidences Time-Barred Suit

The Appellant (original plaintiff) entered into an Agreement to Sell (ATS) with the predecessor of the Respondents on December 30, 1992, for agricultural land in Mehsana.

A possession agreement was executed on February 8, 1995, after the Appellant paid the balance consideration and was put in possession.

The ATS required the land to be converted to non-agricultural (NA) use, with the Appellant bearing expenses and the vendors providing cooperation.

Although the Collector granted permission under Section 63 of the Tenancy Act in 1994, the industrial NA permission under Section 65 of the Revenue Code was rejected by authorities in 2005, and a corresponding revenue entry was mutated on August 9, 2005.

The Appellant filed the suit in July 2023—18 years later—seeking specific performance and permanent injunction.

The Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC as time-barred, which was upheld by the First Appellate Court.

1. Whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. Whether the plaint disclosed a valid cause of action for the relief of permanent injunction regarding possession.

3. Whether the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC was legally sustainable.

Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, which mandates the rejection of a plaint where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a three-year limitation for specific performance from the date fixed for performance, or if no date is fixed, from when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.

The principle of "deemed knowledge" from Becharbhai Zaverbhai Patel v. Jashbhai Shivabhai Patel, holding that registered revenue entries or those discoverable by due diligence constitute notice to the party.

The doctrine against "clever drafting" used to circumvent limitation periods.

The court found that while the ATS linked performance to NA conversion, the NA permission was officially refused in 2005.

The Appellant had produced revenue entries before and after the 2005 refusal entry but suppressed the refusal entry itself, which the court characterized as "clever drafting" to create an illusion of a subsisting cause of action.

Since the refusal was a matter of public record since 2005, the limitation period of three years under Article 54 expired long before the 2023 filing.

Regarding the injunction against dispossession, the court noted that the plaint failed to aver any actual threat or attempt by the Respondents to interfere with possession, thus lacking a cause of action under Order VII Rule 11(a).

The court concluded that concurrent findings of fact regarding the time-barred nature of the suit did not warrant interference under the limited scope of Section 100 CPC.

The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal, affirming the rejection of the plaint, though it clarified that the Appellant remains free to file a fresh suit if a valid cause of action regarding dispossession arises in the future.