Rejection of representation against adverse ACR entries must be reasoned and confined to communicated remarks.

The appellant, a retired Commandant of the 10th Battalion, CRPF, challenged adverse remarks recorded in his Annual Confidential Report (ACR) for the period 2000-2001.

The remarks stated he absented himself from operational duties on medical pretexts and had become a "liability to the force".

The appellant contended that his absences were necessitated by attending a departmental enquiry in New Delhi and sanctioned medical rest for "Gross Lumber Spondylosis," all of which were supported by official movement orders and clearances.

His initial representation was summarily rejected in 2002, leading to a writ petition (W.P.(S) No. 2068 of 2003).

In 2009, the High Court set aside the rejection and directed the Director General (DG), CRPF, to pass a reasoned order.

On March 17, 2010, the DG CRPF again rejected the representation, but this time introduced additional grounds not found in the original ACR communication, such as "poor command and control" and specific details of leave (EL/CL).

The appellant’s subsequent writ petition (W.P.(S) No. 5499 of 2012) was dismissed by a learned Single Judge on April 25, 2023, who upheld the authority's decision.

The appellant then preferred this Letters Patent Appeal (LPA).

1. Whether the competent authority is permitted to travel beyond the communicated adverse entries by adding new grounds of misconduct when deciding a representation.

2. Whether the rejection of a representation using the phrase "strong reasons to believe" without addressing specific documentary evidence constitutes a "reasoned order" or active application of mind.

3. Whether sanctioned leave and medical rest approved by competent authorities can be legally classified as "absenteeism" for the purpose of adverse ACR entries.

The court relied on Dev Dutt v. Union of India (2008) 8 SCC 725, which mandates the communication of all ACR entries to public servants to ensure fairness and provide an opportunity for representation.

This was reinforced by the three-judge bench in Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India (2013) 9 SCC 566.

Regarding the duty to pass reasoned orders, the court applied Chairman, LIC v. A. Masilamani (2013) 6 SCC 530, defining "consideration" as the active application of mind to all relevant materials.

It further referenced State of U.P. v. Yamuna Shanker Misra (1997) 4 SCC 7 regarding the necessity of providing an officer with an opportunity to correct their conduct before recording adverse remarks.

On the issue of remand, the court applied Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84, holding that matters should not be remanded after an excessive lapse of time (in this case, 25 years).

The Division Bench found that the DG CRPF’s order dated March 17, 2010, exceeded its jurisdiction by introducing new allegations—such as poor command and control and specific leave periods—that were never part of the original adverse entry communicated to the appellant in 2001.

The court noted that adding new "misconduct" during the representation process without prior communication violates the principles of natural justice and the mandate in Dev Dutt.

Furthermore, the court observed that the DG CRPF failed to "consider" the appellant's evidence, specifically the "Signals" from the DIG CRPF, Kolkata, which proved that the appellant's medical rest and movements were duly sanctioned.

The authority’s reliance on the phrase "strong reasons to believe" was deemed a mechanical conclusion rather than a reasoned one, as it ignored the fact that sanctioned leave cannot be equated with unauthorized absenteeism.

The Single Judge erred by failing to recognize that the authority had strayed beyond the scope of the original entries and failed to apply its mind to the documentary evidence.

It held that the orders dated September 24, 2001 (adverse remarks) and March 17, 2010 (rejection of representation) were unsustainable in law.

The Court refused to remand the matter to the authorities for a third time, noting that the dispute pertained to entries from 25 years ago and the appellant had already superannuated; remanding would permit the respondent-authority to benefit from its own failure to pass a lawful order despite a prior court direction.

The writ petition (W.P.(S) No. 5499 of 2012) was allowed, and the court directed that consequential benefits be granted to the appellant.