Reliable testimony of prosecutrix is sufficient for conviction under Section 376 IPC absent medical corroboration.

The appellant was accused of entering the informant's house on July 18, 2003, and committing rape

Witnesses testified that the victim raised an alarm and the appellant fled the scene

The appellant was further alleged to be an active extremist who threatened the victim against lodging a complaint

Following a trial where nine prosecution witnesses and two defense witnesses were examined, the Addl. Sessions Judge, FTC-IV, Garhwa, convicted the appellant on February 16, 2005, under Section 376 of the IPC, sentencing him to eight years of rigorous imprisonment

The appellant challenged the conviction citing delays in the FIR, lack of physical evidence, and inconsistencies in medical reports

Whether the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellant suffers from any error of law or fact requiring interference by the High Court?

The court primarily applied Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) regarding the punishment for rape

It relied on the evidentiary principle established in Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130, which holds that the solitary, uncorroborated testimony of a prosecutrix is sufficient for conviction provided it is of "sterling quality," trustworthy, and inspires absolute confidence

The Court found the victim’s testimony to be reliable and consistent, specifically noting her clear description of the assault during cross-examination

The Court observed that the immediate raising of an alarm was corroborated by several prosecution witnesses (P.W.-2 to P.W.-5), to whom the victim narrated the incident shortly after it occurred

While the defense argued that the medical report showed no signs of recent sexual intercourse or injury, the Court prioritized the "unblemished" nature of the oral testimony over the medical findings

Regarding the sentence, the Court noted that over 20 years had passed since the incident and the appellant had already served 4 years, 3 months, and 15 days of his 8-year sentence

However, given the lapse of time and the period already served, the Court modified the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone

The appeal was dismissed on merits with the aforementioned modification in sentence, and the appellant was discharged from his bail bonds