Remand to continue disciplinary inquiry from an infirm stage does not constitute a second inquiry.

The applicant, a Driver Grade III in the Department of Posts, was initially engaged as a daily-wage driver and was later appointed to the regular post of Driver Grade III.

A contractual driver complained that the applicant had taken a silk sari from his residence and demanded money in connection with regularisation of service. The applicant was transferred and suspended, and disciplinary proceedings were initiated under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The first Inquiry Officer submitted a report holding the charge not proved. Despite the applicant’s representation, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the minor penalty of censure on 15/16 June 2015.

On appeal, Respondent No. 3, by order dated 16 November 2015, remitted the matter under Rule 29(1)(v) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, directing continuation of the inquiry from the stage of examination of the prosecution/state witnesses.

The continued inquiry resulted in reports dated 14 June 2017 and 25 July 2017. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority imposed a penalty reducing the applicant’s pay by one stage for three years with cumulative effect. The Appellate Authority confirmed the punishment on 29 July 2020.

The applicant challenged the remand order, punishment order and appellate order, principally contending that the proceedings constituted an impermissible second or de novo inquiry on the same charges after the earlier inquiry and imposition of censure.

1. Whether the order dated 16 November 2015 under Rule 29(1)(v) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 authorised an impermissible second or de novo inquiry after the first inquiry had concluded and a penalty of censure had been imposed?

2. Whether the continued disciplinary proceedings, the consequential punishment order dated 31 December 2019 and the appellate order dated 29 July 2020 were legally sustainable?

3. Whether the delay in finalising the disciplinary proceedings vitiated the inquiry or the punishment?

The Tribunal applied Rule 29(1)(v) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which permits the appellate authority to remit a disciplinary case to the authority that made the order for further inquiry or action, subject to the prescribed procedure.

The Tribunal distinguished between a fresh de novo inquiry, which restarts proceedings into the same charges, and a remand for continuation from a specified defective stage, which carries forward the existing inquiry.

The Tribunal also considered the principles relied upon in Som Nath Sharma v. Union of India, (1994) 27 ATC 771, and Sujit Kr. Debey v. Union of India, 195 Swamy’s CL Digest 1997, concerning the impermissibility of a second inquiry in appropriate circumstances.

On delay, it relied on Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, (2015) 16 SCC 415, for the principle that undue and unexplained delay in disciplinary proceedings may be subject to judicial scrutiny, although delay does not automatically vitiate proceedings absent substantial prejudice.

The Tribunal also noted the suspension power under Rule 10(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, though suspension was not the decisive issue.

The Tribunal held that the order dated 16 November 2015 did not direct a fresh inquiry from the beginning. It specifically remitted the case for continuation from the stage of examination of the prosecution/state witnesses.

No fresh charge-sheet was issued, and the disciplinary proceedings were not restarted ab initio; the existing charges and inquiry framework were carried forward from the stage identified by the remand order.

Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s premise that a second, independent inquiry had been conducted after the earlier imposition of censure. It treated the proceedings as a continuation of the original inquiry authorised under Rule 29(1)(v), rather than as an impermissible second inquiry.

The Tribunal further held that the delay caused by the continued inquiry and the transfer of the Investigating Officer was not shown to be so inordinate or prejudicial as to invalidate the proceedings. Applying the principle in Prem Nath Bali, it found no sufficient basis to interfere with the inquiry or punishment on the ground of delay.

The punishment order dated 31 December 2019 and the appellate order dated 29 July 2020 were held legally sustainable.

The Original Application was dismissed, any pending miscellaneous application was disposed of, and there was no order as to costs.