Repeal of GIA Order 1994 does not absolutely bar benefits where prior recommendations exist.

The appellant’s claim for the benefit of the Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994 (“GIA Order 1994”) was rejected by the State Education Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, in GIA Case No. 2167 of 2017 by order dated 10 December 2019.

Before the High Court, it was admitted that the appellant’s case was covered by State of Odisha v. Ratnakar Mohapatra & Another, FAO No. 509 of 2014 and batch, decided on 19 March 2025, whose principles were affirmed by the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Diary No. 6943 of 2026 and batch, disposed of on 25 March 2026.

Whether the appellant’s claim for grant-in-aid under the GIA Order 1994 could be rejected solely on the basis of the decisions in Lokanath Behere and Loknath Behera.

Whether the appellant was entitled to have his eligibility and claim verified by the competent State authority in light of State of Odisha v. Ratnakar Mohapatra.

Whether the Tribunal’s order dated 10 December 2019 was liable to be quashed and reconsidered by the Director of Higher Education.

The Court applied the principles governing eligibility for grant-in-aid under the GIA Order 1994, particularly the rule that the judgment in State of Odisha v. Anup Kumar Senapati does not constitute an absolute bar where employees and institutions are otherwise eligible and the requisite recommendations were made by the concerned Directorate before repeal of the GIA Order 1994.

Relying on State of Odisha v. Ratnakar Mohapatra, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Court held that the State authorities must verify the relevant facts, including eligibility, prior recommendations, the nature of the institution, and orders passed in analogous cases, and thereafter pass appropriate orders within the prescribed period.

The Tribunal had rejected the appellant’s claim by treating Lokanath Behere and Loknath Behera as precluding relief under the GIA Order 1994.

However, the subsequent decision in Ratnakar Mohapatra, affirmed by the Supreme Court, clarified that the relevant precedents did not create a complete or absolute bar to grant-in-aid claims. Instead, the competent authorities were required to examine whether the employee and institution were otherwise eligible and whether the necessary recommendations had been made before repeal of the GIA Order 1994.

Since the appellant’s case was admitted to be covered by that principle and there was no factual dispute requiring further adjudication, the High Court held that the Director of Higher Education should undertake the requisite verification rather than allow the Tribunal’s rejection to stand.

The Director of Higher Education, Odisha, was directed to verify the appellant’s claim in light of the facts recorded in the Tribunal’s order and to extend the applicable benefit in accordance with the principles laid down in State of Odisha v. Ratnakar Mohapatra, subject to satisfaction of the eligibility requirements. The exercise was directed to be completed preferably within four months from receipt of the certified copy of the High Court’s order and the appeal memorandum.