Repeated deficiency notices and a cure opportunity satisfy natural justice before temporary tender suspension.

NHIDCL awarded the petitioner an EPC contract for a 14-km stretch of NH-108B in Tripura. After completion, the petitioner was responsible for maintaining the highway for five years.

NHIDCL reported continuing defects, including potholes, cracks and damaged road furniture, and found the petitioner’s rectification work inadequate.

On 25 September 2026, NHIDCL temporarily suspended the petitioner from participating in tenders floated by NHIDCL and MoRTH for one month.

The petitioner challenged the order under Article 226, principally arguing that it had been made without a separate show-cause notice or hearing.

NHIDCL responded that it had repeatedly notified the petitioner of the deficiencies and that the suspension addressed public-safety concerns.

1. Whether the temporary suspension could be set aside because no separate show-cause notice was issued immediately before it.

2. Whether the Court should interfere under Article 226 with the suspension, given that the dispute arose from contractual maintenance obligations and the suspension was temporary.

Article 226 review in contractual disputes is limited, particularly where resolving the dispute requires examination of contractual obligations and performance-related material.

An order of debarment with civil consequences ordinarily requires compliance with the principles of natural justice.

The MoRTH Circular dated 6 October 2021 permits temporary suspension from ongoing or future bidding for up to one month where a contractor’s conduct endangers public safety, pending regular proceedings under the prescribed procedure.

The Court found that the petitioner had been repeatedly informed of the highway deficiencies, directed to carry out rectification, and issued a Cure Period Notice to which it responded.

In those circumstances, it held that the absence of a separate show-cause notice immediately before the temporary suspension did not justify setting the order aside.

The suspension was imposed under the MoRTH Circular in light of the reported deficiencies and public-safety concerns, was limited to one month, and did not amount to a final debarment.

The Court also declined to undertake a technical assessment of the highway’s condition or determine attribution of each deficiency in writ proceedings.

It clarified that its observations were confined to the challenge to the temporary suspension and would not prejudice the parties’ rights in contractual disputes or further proceedings.

Pending applications were disposed of.