Repeated reunion efforts undermine proof of animus deserendi, essential to establishing desertion.

The parties married on 2 February 2006 and had a son, born on 1 February 2007. They later began living separately.

The husband petitioned for divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; the wife sought restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9.

The Family Court granted the divorce and dismissed the wife’s petition. She appealed, relying, among other matters, on letters seeking reunion and her efforts to restore the relationship.

1. Whether the husband proved cruelty and desertion sufficient to dissolve the marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act

2. Whether the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights should be allowed

Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, permits divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion; Section 9 provides for restitution of conjugal rights.

Relying on Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena @ Mota, AIR 1964 SC 40, the Court stated that desertion requires both the factum of separation and the intention permanently to end cohabitation (animus deserendi), assessed from the parties’ conduct and circumstances before and after separation.

The Court further required the allegations of cruelty to be established by sufficient and convincing evidence.

The wife’s letters seeking reunion, approaches to authorities, and petition for restitution indicated a continuing willingness to resume matrimonial life and weighed against an intention permanently to abandon the relationship. The Court therefore held that separation alone did not establish desertion.

It also found that the husband’s allegations of abusive language, throwing household articles, and other acts of cruelty were not supported by sufficient convincing evidence; the Family Court had not properly assessed the wife’s documentary evidence and the parties’ circumstances.

It dismissed the husband’s divorce petition and allowed the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights. Both appeals were allowed, with no order as to costs.