Reproduction of an award alone does not make a Section 34 judgment non-speaking.

AAI had leased airport land to Sahara under a 2002 lease, which was listed as an Existing Lease in the 2006 OMDA between AAI and MIAL.

The OMDA excluded land under Existing Leases from the land demised to MIAL, while Article 5.2(b)(i) provided for efforts to transfer or novate existing airport-related contracts and for the benefits of certain contracts to vest in MIAL.

MIAL contended that this provision required AAI to transfer or assign its lessor’s interest under the Sahara lease. It relied, among other things, on AAI’s 2006 letter, rent payments passed on to MIAL for approximately ten years, ministerial communications and pre-contractual minutes.

The arbitral tribunal rejected MIAL’s claims; the Single Judge dismissed MIAL’s Section 34 challenge. MIAL appealed under Section 37.

1. Whether the Single Judge’s judgment was liable to be set aside because it reproduced portions of the Award and allegedly failed to meaningfully adjudicate MIAL’s objections.

2. Whether the Tribunal’s interpretation of the OMDA and Lease Deed concerning transfer of AAI’s lessor’s interest was so unreasonable or perverse as to warrant interference under Section 34.

3. Whether the Tribunal’s treatment of AAI’s letter, subsequent rent payments, MoCA communications and the Inter-Ministerial Group minutes disclosed a ground for interference under Section 34.

Under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a court may not reappreciate evidence or substitute its preferred contractual interpretation for a plausible arbitral view; Section 37 scrutiny is confined to whether the Section 34 court acted within its statutory limits [*MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.*, (2019) 4 SCC 163; *Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills*, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632; *UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh*, (2022) 4 SCC 116].

Patent illegality under Section 34(2A) must go to the root of the matter and does not permit routine correction of errors or reweighing of evidence [*Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI*, (2019) 15 SCC 131].

Contractual interpretation is ordinarily for the tribunal, which may consider the contract, parties’ conduct and correspondence [*McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd.*, (2006) 11 SCC 181].

A judgment’s reproduction of an award does not alone establish non-application of mind; the question is whether it meaningfully adjudicates the challenge.

Article 20.3.2 of the OMDA addresses conflict between the OMDA and a project agreement; Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 concerns consequences of a transfer of the lessor’s interest but does not itself establish a contractual obligation to transfer it.

The Court held that the Single Judge’s reproduction of parts of the Award did not, by itself, show a failure to adjudicate: read as a whole, the judgment addressed the contractual framework and MIAL’s principal objections.

Although the distinction between demising the land and transferring AAI’s lessor’s interest was material, the Tribunal had read Article 5.2(b)(i) alongside the provisions excluding Existing Leases from the Demised Premises. That interpretation could stand if it was a plausible reconciliation of the contractual scheme; Article 20.3.2 and Section 109 did not independently establish MIAL’s asserted obligation.

The letter and payments were relevant to the parties’ understanding, but neither conclusively established that the lessor’s interest had transferred or that the OMDA required its transfer. The MoCA communications did not establish a binding Section 40 policy direction, and the pre-contractual minutes did not themselves create a contractual obligation.

The Court found no demonstrated omission or interpretation meeting the threshold for Section 34 interference.

The appeal was dismissed.