Reservation Lapses Automatically Under Section 127 of MRTP Act if Acquisition Steps Fail Within Statutory Period

The Petitioner owns agricultural land (Approx. 2.28 Hectares) in Mouza Warud, which was reserved for a "Weekly Market" under a Development Plan that came into force on 01/09/2005.

After ten years of non-acquisition, the Petitioner served a purchase notice under Section 127(1) of the MRTP Act on 20/07/2023.

As the Planning Authority (Respondent No. 3) failed to initiate acquisition within the statutory 24-month period, Respondent No. 2 (Director, Town Planning) issued an official order on 10/10/2025 declaring the reservation lapsed and releasing the land.

However, on 17/10/2025, Respondent No. 1 (Secretary, Urban Development Dept.) issued a communication staying the lapsing order, allegedly at the behest of a local MLA (Respondent No. 5), prompting this writ petition.

1. Whether the State Government or Director of Town Planning has the authority to stay an order of lapsing of reservation once the statutory period under Section 127 of the MRTP Act has expired.

2. Whether the impugned stay order was a valid exercise of power or a colourable exercise of authority influenced by political interference.

The court primarily applied Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional & Town Planning (MRTP) Act, 1966, which mandates that if land is not acquired within ten years of a plan's commencement and further steps are not taken within 24 months of a purchase notice, the reservation "shall be deemed to have lapsed" by operation of law.

It further relied on the principle that lapsing is a self-executing statutory consequence.

The court also referred to the precedent in Savitribai v. State of Maharashtra (2009), which deprecates political interference in the functioning of quasi-judicial authorities.

The Court reasoned that lapsing of reservation under Section 127 is a "formal expression" of a legal consequence that occurs automatically by operation of law once the 24-month notice period expires without acquisition steps.

Respondent No. 2, having already notified the lapsing on 10/10/2025, became functus officio and lacked the power to stay his own notification.

Furthermore, Respondent No. 1 acted as an unauthorized "appellate authority" without any statutory provision for such an appeal.

The Court found the stay was issued just three days after a letter from a local MLA (Respondent No. 5), concluding the action was a "colourable exercise of power" and "vitiated by bias," overriding the Petitioner’s constitutional rights under Article 300-A.

The High Court quashed and set aside the impugned communications dated 17/10/2025 issued by Respondents No. 1 and 2. The Rule was made absolute, effectively restoring the notification that released the Petitioner’s land from reservation.