Retirement based on a disputed date of birth requires prior determination under Implementation Instruction No. 76.

The petitioner was appointed as a General Labourer on 19.05.1980. His statutory Form-B, medical records, identity card, Form PS-3 and other service documents recorded his date of birth as 01.01.1959.

The respondents, however, treated his date of birth as 01.07.1957, relying, inter alia, on records prepared in 1988, including a Coal Mines Provident Fund declaration.

On 01.03.2016 and again on 18.07.2016, the petitioner was informed that he would retire on 30.06.2017. He submitted an objection dated 16.03.2016 disputing the date of birth and claiming that his correct superannuation date was 01.01.2019.

The objection was not decided before his retirement and was rejected only on 04.01.2018, after his superannuation.

The petitioner therefore invoked Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the retirement-related orders, correction of his date of birth and consequential service and retiral benefits.

Whether the respondents could retire the petitioner on the basis of the disputed date of birth without first determining the discrepancy between the competing service records in accordance with Implementation Instruction No. 76 and the principles of natural justice?

Whether the petitioner’s claim for correction of date of birth was liable to be rejected merely because it was raised near the end of his service?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to quashing of the retirement notice and order, and to consequential retiral benefits subject to determination of his correct date of birth?

The Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to review the legality of the respondents’ action.

It applied the principles of natural justice, holding that where an employer’s records contain inconsistent dates of birth, the employee must be given an effective opportunity to participate in a reasoned determination of the correct date.

Relying on Shankar Lal v. Hindustan Copper Limited & Others, (2022) 6 SCC 211, the Court held that although employees are generally discouraged from seeking correction of their date of birth at the fag end of service, the same principle must apply to the employer; an employer cannot rely on one record during service and later rely on another record to curtail the employee’s tenure or benefits.

The Court distinguished Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Shyam Kishore Singh, (2020) 3 SCC 411 and Prabhat Kumar Dwivedi v. Union of India, 2018 (3) MPLJ 382, where the employees had remained silent or had failed to make timely objections.

The respondents were required to determine the date of birth in accordance with Implementation Instruction No. 76.

The Court found that the petitioner’s principal service records consistently recorded his date of birth as 01.01.1959, whereas the respondents relied on a different date, 01.07.1957, appearing in later records.

Although the respondents contended that the petitioner had knowledge of the disputed entry from the 1988 Coal Mines Provident Fund declaration, the Court held that the petitioner had promptly objected immediately after receiving the retirement communications in 2016.

The respondents’ failure to decide that objection before retirement deprived the petitioner of an effective opportunity to challenge the proposed superannuation.

Applying Shankar Lal, the Court held that the dispute could not be rejected solely on the ground that it was raised at the fag end of service, particularly when the employer itself had failed to undertake a proper determination and had delayed deciding the petitioner’s representation.

Consequently, the retirement action was unsustainable until the petitioner’s date of birth was determined through a reasoned process under Implementation Instruction No. 76.

The respondents were directed to reconsider and determine the petitioner’s date of birth on the basis of duly verified service records, strictly in accordance with Implementation Instruction No. 76, and to pass a reasoned order.

If the petitioner was found entitled to correction of his date of birth, the respondents were directed to extend all consequential retiral benefits in accordance with law, excluding monetary benefits for the remaining period of service.

The petition was accordingly disposed of.