Review jurisdiction cannot be invoked to re-agitate findings absent an error apparent.

The appellant filed a review petition under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC against the judgment dated 9 July 2026 in RFA No. 73/2023, through her son and attorney, Deepak Garg.

The appellant contended that the lease deed dated 10 March 2003 had expired on 31 December 2004 and that the respondent bank’s possession became unauthorised after termination of the tenancy by notice dated 9 May 2008, effective 1 June 2008.

She challenged the earlier judgment’s reliance on certain unregistered letters and an undertaking to hold that the tenancy had been extended for five years, until April 2012.

She further alleged that the Court had failed to apply the principle of 15% annual enhancement of mesne profits, as discussed in Anil Kumar Khanna v. The Indian Tourism Development Corporation , and had wrongly denied mesne profits from 11 August 2008 to April 2012.

The appellant also sought interest on unpaid mesne profits after the property was vacated on 31 December 2017.

The Court heard the submissions and examined the record.

1. Whether the earlier judgment contained an error apparent on the face of the record in holding, on the basis of the unregistered documents, that the respondent’s tenancy was extended for five years and that mesne profits were consequently not payable until April 2012.

2. Whether the alleged non-consideration of the principle of 15% annual enhancement of rent or mesne profits constituted a ground for review.

3. Whether the Court’s decision not to award interest on unpaid mesne profits after 31 December 2017 warranted review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

A review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is confined to the discovery of new and important matter or evidence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason; it cannot be used as an appeal or to reargue the merits of the case.

The appellant relied on Sections 107 and 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, concerning registration requirements for leases exceeding one year and determination of a lease by efflux of time, and Section 49 of the Registration Act, concerning the limited use of unregistered instruments.

Section 34 CPC governs the discretionary award of interest on the principal sum adjudged.

The appellant also relied on R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P. , (1995) 5 SCC 698, Anil Kumar Khanna v. The Indian Tourism Development Corporation , decided on 17 July 2015, and Lilly Thomas v. Union of India , (2000) 6 SCC 224; however, the Court held that these contentions either concerned the merits or did not disclose a reviewable error.

The Court held that its earlier conclusion regarding the five-year extension of the tenancy was supported by cogent reasons based on the letters dated 6 January 2005 and 26 December 2007 and the undertaking dated 2 February 2007.

The appellant’s challenge to the legal effect and sufficiency of those documents amounted to an attempt to reopen the merits, rather than demonstrating an obvious and self-evident error.

Consequently, the claim for mesne profits from 11 August 2008 to April 2012 and the plea for retrospective enhancement of mesne profits merely repeated arguments already considered and rejected in the appellate judgment.

Similarly, the award of interest under Section 34 CPC involved judicial discretion, and disagreement with the exercise of that discretion did not establish an error apparent on the face of the record.

None of the grounds disclosed new evidence, an apparent error, or any other sufficient reason within the limited scope of review.

It held that the review petition sought to re-agitate findings on the validity and duration of the tenancy, entitlement to mesne profits, enhancement of those profits, and post-2017 interest, rather than correct any error apparent on the face of the record.

The Review Petition was dismissed, and the pending application was also disposed of.