Review jurisdiction cannot be used for reappraisal of issues absent an error apparent on the record.

The petitioner sought review of the judgment dated 27 March 2026 in Second Appeal No. 502 of 2023, by which the High Court dismissed his second appeal and affirmed the concurrent judgments and decree of the trial and appellate courts.

The petitioner contended that he acquired knowledge of the disputed sale deed and alleged irregularities only after obtaining documents under the Right to Information Act.

He further argued that limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact and could not have been decided while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

He also relied on allegations of fraud, unauthorized execution of the sale deed, and continuing illegal possession after expiry of the alleged lease period.

The review petition was filed with a delay of 92 days, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, I.A. No. 1 of 2026.

The Court noted that the issues raised in review had already been argued and adjudicated in the second appeal in the presence of the petitioner’s earlier counsel.

Whether the petitioner established an error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important matter, or any other sufficient reason warranting review of the judgment dated 27 March 2026.

Whether the petitioner’s contentions regarding limitation, fraud, RTI-based discovery of the sale deed, and continuing cause of action amounted to grounds for review rather than an impermissible request for re-hearing or re-appreciation of the matter.

Whether the delay of 92 days in filing the review petition was satisfactorily explained and could be condoned.

The Court applied the limited scope of review jurisdiction, under which review is permissible only upon discovery of new and important evidence despite due diligence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or another sufficient reason; review cannot serve as an appeal or a vehicle for re-hearing and re-appreciation of evidence.

The Court also applied the principle that a patent and self-evident error may be reviewed, whereas an error requiring a process of reasoning cannot be corrected in review.

Reliance was placed on Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai , (1987) 1 SCC 61; Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury , (1995) 1 SCC 170; Avijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Terai Tea Co. , (1996) 10 SCC 174; Lily Thomas v. Union of India , AIR 2000 SC 1650; Akhilesh Yadav v. Vishwanath Chaturvedi , (2013) 2 SCC 1; and Sasi v. Aravindakshan Nair , (2017) 4 SCC 692, which affirm the narrow limits of review jurisdiction.

The Court additionally required a plausible and satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the review petition.

The Court held that the petitioner’s assertions concerning the date of knowledge, limitation, fraud, and continuing cause of action substantially sought reconsideration of matters already canvassed and decided in the second appeal.

Those contentions did not disclose a patent error apparent on the face of the record, nor did they constitute newly discovered material or any other sufficient ground for review.

The Court emphasized that examining whether limitation was a mixed question of law and fact, or whether the pleaded facts created a continuing cause of action, would require re-appraisal of the merits and effectively convert the review proceeding into an appellate rehearing, which is impermissible.

Independently, the petitioner failed to provide a plausible or satisfactory explanation for the 92-day delay.

It found no error apparent on the face of the record or any other legally sufficient ground for review, and held that the grounds raised amounted to an impermissible attempt to re-argue the second appeal.

The delay of 92 days was also held to be inadequately explained.

Accordingly, the review petition was dismissed.