Review jurisdiction cannot be used to seek enhanced relief or reappraise merits.

The applicant had earlier filed OA No. 652/2026, which was disposed of by order dated 07.07.2026 in terms of the Tribunal’s earlier decision in OA No. 3783/2024.

The Tribunal directed the Chairman, Staff Selection Commission, to apply a 2% normalization formula to the applicant’s result and grant consequential benefits.

The applicant challenged the order before the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No. 10611/2026. The High Court disposed of the writ petition on 30.07.2026, granting liberty to the applicant to seek review before the Tribunal.

The applicant thereafter filed RA No. 103/2026, along with MA No. 4175/2026 seeking condonation of an eight-day delay.

He contended that the Tribunal had not expressly considered his prayer for proportionate relaxation corresponding to the alleged 20–25% functional disruption suffered during the Skill Test.

Whether the applicant had shown sufficient cause for condonation of the eight-day delay in filing the Review Application.

Whether the Tribunal’s order dated 07.07.2026 contained an error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient ground warranting review under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987.

Whether the applicant could, in review jurisdiction, seek a higher or proportionate relaxation based on the alleged actual extent of disruption during the Skill Test.

The Tribunal applied the principles governing review jurisdiction under Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 read with Rule 17 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987.

Review is limited to correcting an error apparent on the face of the record or addressing another sufficient ground; it is not an appellate jurisdiction and cannot be used for rehearing, reappraisal of evidence, or seeking a different relief.

The Tribunal also applied the principle that delay may be condoned where the applicant demonstrates sufficient cause and the delay is bona fide, short, and not attributable to deliberate or negligent conduct.

The liberty granted by a superior court to pursue review does not enlarge the statutory scope of review jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found sufficient cause for the eight-day delay because the applicant had been bona fide pursuing proceedings before the Delhi High Court and had filed the Review Application shortly after receiving liberty to do so.

The delay was short, unexplained by deliberate or negligent conduct, and caused no apparent prejudice to the respondents; accordingly, it was condoned.

On merits, the Tribunal held that the original order had consciously granted specific relief by directing application of the 2% normalization formula in accordance with OA No. 3783/2024, together with consequential benefits under the relief clause.

The applicant’s request for relaxation corresponding to an alleged 20–25% disruption would require determination of the factual extent of disruption, its impact on performance, and the appropriate quantum of relief.

Those questions concerned the merits and would require reconsideration of the relief already determined, which was impermissible in review.

The omission to separately discuss every component of the relief clause did not constitute an error apparent on the face of the record.

The High Court’s grant of liberty merely enabled the applicant to invoke review jurisdiction and did not establish the merits of the review or expand its permissible scope.

However, it held that the applicant had not demonstrated any error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient ground for review.

The request for a higher, proportionate relaxation amounted to seeking reconsideration of the nature and quantum of relief, which was outside the scope of review jurisdiction.

RA No. 103/2026 was therefore dismissed in circulation, with no order as to costs.