Review: Tribunal cannot re-examine merits or sit in appeal over its own judgment.

The applicant, Vidhya Ravindran, filed a Review Application (RA) seeking to review an earlier order (Annexure RA-1, dated 14.11.2025) passed by the Tribunal in OA No. 99/2024.

She contended that the facts of her original application were entirely different from the case relied upon by the Tribunal in its previous order and were more similar to other Original Applications (Nos. 81/2022, 572/2021, 587/2021, and 799/2018) which had been allowed by the Tribunal.

The applicant claimed that the RA-1 order was based on a "wrong notion" that she had been reverted and joined a lower post, thus constituting an "error" that warranted review.

The respondents, in their counter statement, argued that the review applicant had not pointed out any "error on the face" of the final order (Annexure RA-1) that was "prima facie visible" and did not require "detailed examination".

They asserted that the alleged error pertained to the "judicious view" taken by the Tribunal, and a review cannot be sought merely because a different view could have been taken.

1. Whether the applicant had demonstrated an "error apparent on the face of the record" in the Tribunal's previous order (Annexure RA-1) that would warrant a review.

2. Whether the Tribunal, while exercising its power of review, could sit in appeal over its own judgment on the ground that a different view could have been taken on a point of fact or law.

The Tribunal primarily applied the principles governing the power of review, drawing extensively from the Supreme Court's judgment in *State of West Bengal and others v. Kamal Sengupta and another* {(2008) 8 SCC 612}.

This precedent established that an "error apparent" must be "evident per se from the record" and not require "detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation".

It specified that an order cannot be corrected "merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken".

The Tribunal also referred to *Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma*, which cited *Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909*, to clarify that while review power is inherent to prevent miscarriage of justice or correct "grave and palpable errors," it has "definitive limits".

Review may be exercised for "discovery of new and important matter" or "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record" but "not ... on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits," as that falls under appellate power.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's contention regarding the RA-1 order being based on a "wrong notion" or dissimilar facts did not meet the stringent criteria for an "error apparent on the face of the record".

The respondents successfully argued that the alleged error related to the Tribunal's "judicious view" and that the review application essentially sought to re-argue the case on grounds that a different view could have been taken.

The Tribunal, relying on the Supreme Court's pronouncements in *Kamal Sengupta* and *Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma*, concluded that the power of review is not an appellate power; it cannot be exercised to correct a decision merely because it might be erroneous on merits or because a different interpretation of facts or law could have been made.

The applicant's plea essentially amounted to an attempt to have the Tribunal sit in appeal over its own judgment, which is expressly prohibited by the established legal position.

It was accordingly dismissed, with no costs awarded.

The core finding was that the applicant failed to demonstrate a patent error visible without elaborate argument, as required for a review, and was instead attempting to re-litigate the merits of the previous decision.